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ABSTRACT  
 
This thesis is a tool for evaluating the ethical desirability of considerable life extension. The 
discussion on the topic brings together metaphysical questions related to life and death as 
well as practical bioethical concerns related to just distribution, the environment and new 
technologies. Due to the multifacetedness of the topic, there does not exist a unified 
ethical discussion on the issue.  
 
Manipulating the biological aging process by means of new medical technology changes 
the way we look at old age, aging and mortality. Intuitively, people see life as a good thing. 
Most people think that death is bad and that more life is always better. Yet most people 
would not want to live forever. This paradox is essential: we do not want to die but we do 
not want to live forever, either. On the other hand, living for hundreds of years is very 
different from eternity and thus a considerably long life appeals to many. 
 
Life extension is personally desirable for many but some philosophers argue against life 
extension based on societal or environmental concerns. My claim is that even though it is 
not obvious that considerable life extension would be ethically desirable, it is at least 
ethically acceptable. However, there are also good reasons to remain cautious when 
developing solutions that could enable a considerably long life by manipulating the process 
of biological aging.   
 
The first part of the thesis is an introduction to the ethics considerable life extension. The 
second part consists of reprinted original articles on more specific themes related to the 
topic.  
 
Keywords: bioethics, considerable life extension, death, human enhancement, immortality, life 
extension, philosophy of death 
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TIIVISTELMÄ 
 
Väitöskirjani tarkastelee ihmisen eliniän huomattavaan pidentämiseen liittyviä eettisiä 
kysymyksiä. Aiheeseen liittyvässä keskustelussa elämään ja kuolemaan liittyvät 
metafyysiset kysymykset yhdistyvät bioeettisiin kysymyksiin oikeudenmukaisuudesta, 
ympäristöön liittyvistä asioista ja uusista teknologioista. Aihe on siis varsin moniulotteinen 
eikä eliniän huomattavaan pidentämiseen liittyvä eettinen keskustelu ole yhtenäinen. 
Biologisen ikääntymisprosessin manipuloiminen lääketieteen teknologian avulla muuttaa 
käsitystämme ikääntymisestä, vanhuudesta ja kuolevaisuudesta.  
 
Useimpien ihmisten intuitio on että elämä on hyvä asia. Kuolema taas nähdään yleensä 
pahana asiana ja pitkä elämä parempana kuin lyhyt. On kuitenkin yleistä, että ihminen ei 
halua elää ikuisesti. Tämä paradoksi on elinikään liittyvän filosofisen keskustelun 
ytimessä. Emme halua kuolla mutta emme myöskään elää ikuisesti. Toisaalta joidenkin 
satojen vuosien mittainen elämä on selvästi eri asia kuin ikuisuus ja siksi pidennetty elämä 
houkuttaa monia.  
 
Vaikka moni pitää eliniän pidentämistä henkilökohtaisesti tavoiteltavana, sitä vastaan on 
argumentoitu vetoamalla muun muassa yhteiskunnallisiin ja ympäristöön liittyviin 
haasteisiin. Oma johtopäätökseni on, että vaikka eliniän huomattava pidentäminen ei 
välttämättä ole eettisesti tavoiteltavaa, se on ainakin eettisesti hyväksyttävää. Biologiseen 
ikääntymisen prosessin muokkaamiseen liittyviä ratkaisuja on kuitenkin arvioitava 
huolellisesti.  Väitöskirjan ensimmäinen osa on johdanto, jossa esitellään huomattavaan 
eliniän pidentämiseen liittyvää eettistä keskustelua. Toinen osa koostuu 
alkuperäisartikkeleista, jotka käsittelevät tarkemmin aiheeseen liittyviä teemoja.  
 
Asiasanat: bioetiikka, etiikka, elinikä, eliniän huomattava pidentäminen, ihmisen parantelu, 
kuolema, kuoleman filosofia, kuolemattomuus 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter, I will introduce the motivation and background for writing a Doctoral Thesis 
about the ethics of considerable life extension. Throughout the thesis, I aim to maintain a 
humane approach to life, death and life extension although many of the philosophical 
issues are very technical. In this chapter, I will also briefly explain the methods and 
approach used in the research.  
 
1.2 BACKGROUND  
 
I was four when I realized I will one day die. I was laying in my bed somewhere in a rental 
cabin in Sweden, waiting to fall asleep after a fun summer’s day. It was a kind of neutral, 
logical realization; by the time my two-year-old little brother will be my age, I will be six. 
When he will be six, I will be eight. And so on, until one day (as impossible as it felt at that 
time), I will reach the age of thirty-something like my parents, then sixty-something like my 
grandparents, then perhaps even eighty-something like my grand-grandma who lived 
upstairs from my grandparents...and then, I will die. 
 
Obviously, I didn’t particularly like the idea of dying, nor did I understand what it means - I 
still don’t. In my surroundings, most people died due to old age. I knew about funerals but 
the concept was of death was very abstract. Christian religious beliefs were introduced to 
me as they are introduced to a child when her family is not particularly religious but the 
‘secular’ society around is still built around Christian traditions and it’s still normal to sing 
hymns at the school celebrations (this was the social landscape of Finland in the early 
1990’s). People tell their children that dead relatives go to heaven. It’s easy. Honestly I 
don’t remember what I was told. I was aware of the Bible, Jesus, and angels, embraced 
them for a short time and then let it all go.  
 
What caused me to wonder upon these things in the first place well before my sixth 
birthday, I can’t tell. I’m guessing that I just let the philosophical tendencies of a child’s 
2 
 
mind run free. I remember concluding that after one is dead, one doesn’t exist anymore. 
Yet I had, obviously, difficulties understanding what this means. My thinking was 
compatible with the prevailing scientific, academic worldview. In a way, it is an Epicurean 
way of thinking. This is not to say that the five-year-old me was as intelligent as Epicuros 
or established academics of our time: it is to say that questions about metaphysics and 
ethics of death and life are highly intuitive. What does it mean for your life to end? Will you 
live in an eternal emptiness? Would you not do anything to avoid that? Would it be good to 
live forever?  
 
To answer these questions, philosophy can be of use. In relation to personal experiences 
and feelings, I can only speak for myself. But the questions that intrigue me are universal. 
As Epicuros said, once we die there is no one left to experience pain or pleasure – or 
‘being dead’. Although this rational explanation can offer some comfort, it does not always 
manage to do its job; it does not abolish the fear of death. Even when it does, there is 
another question to ask: even if I accept the fact that someday I will be gone, would I still 
gladly embrace more experiences, more encounters, more feelings – more life?     
 
I was twenty-five when I started to explore the theme of death in philosophy, motivated by 
my supervisor’s suggestion. By that time, I had learned plenty about life and death 
compared to the time I was four. Yet these things seemed as mysterious as ever. As I had 
already started my philosophical exploration of the limits of humanness, continuing to do 
research related to new technologies and the changes they might bring along felt like a 
natural way to proceed with. Thus, to make a long story short, by combining a few of my 
central interests with the theme of death, I ended up working with questions related to 
considerable life extension. It is related to many ethical fields such as ethics of new and 
emerging technology, medical ethics, global justice, and philosophy of death. 
 
At times, the issue has felt quite heavy and a little bit uncomfortable. The discussion about 
considerable life extension is inherently related to the meaning of life and death, which 
makes it fundamentally intriguing, terrifying, universal and personal at once. The theme of 
death has been a rising field of philosophy for the past 20 or 30 years. Perhaps this is, at 
least partly, due to the change in the way we think of our humanness in the rise of modern 
technology and medicine. Perhaps it is also a result of the need for new ways of 
confronting death and of forming rituals.  
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This work is an exploration of ethical questions related to considerable life extension. 
Considerable life extension, in this work, refers to the possibility of extending human life by 
hundreds or even thousands of years by means of medical technology. The ethical 
questions related are multiple and challenging. The ethical discussion is vague and 
interdisciplinary in nature, which makes it even more challenging to explore considerable 
life extension as a unified issue.  
 
The topic attracts plenty of attention in academia and outside of it. The public interest 
means that there is a possibility for philosophy to serve as a helpful tool for general 
audience to grasp a somewhat complicated issue. In the case of bioethical issues I think 
that it is an opportunity for, and to some extent a responsibility of, a researcher to 
sometimes reach beyond academic circles to serve others who are possibly struggling to 
understand the same issue that you are working with on a daily basis. There are many 
ways to look death in the eye, and philosophy is one of them. Since death has no 
relevance without life, researching the arguments about life extension also help in defining 
what do we find valuable in life. I still believe firmly that I will one day die and so will you. 
But in the meantime, we can keep discovering the things that make life -and perhaps 
extending it - meaningful.  
1.2 METHODOLOGY 
 
This Doctoral Thesis is a critical overview on the existing ethical discussion on 
considerable life extension by means of medical technology. It is a literary review based on 
ethical literature mostly, although not exclusively, from the 1980’s to early 2000’s. Classic 
writings such as Epicurus’s view on death are included but the emphasis is on their 
contemporary interpretation. I concentrate on the tradition of analytical philosophy. There 
is no particular ethical theory I aim to argue for. Rather, I map out the main ethical 
questions related to the topic, analyze the arguments and evaluate the coherence and 
unity of the discussion. At the end, I make some conclusions and suggestions considering 
what ethical viewpoints should be taken into account when discussing considerable life 
extension. For this purpose, I introduce a tool called the CLE table. My suggestions are 
aimed to be helpful for researchers, students, decision-makers, healthcare professionals 
and others interested in the issue.   
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2. Death and Immortality    
 
My research centers around life. But when we talk about life, death is never too far away – 
the two are inevitably intertwined. Throughout history, philosophers have discussed the 
nature and meaning of death. In this chapter, I will take a brief look at the Western 
understanding of death including death’s medical criteria and philosophical definition as 
well as some reflections on causes of death. An overview on questions related to 
immortality is also included, since immortality is closely related - either rhetorically or 
philosophically - to discussion on considerable life extension. 
 
2.1 What Is Death and Is It Bad for Us? 
 
What is death? Answering this question is crucial for understanding further questions 
related to death. Death can be defined as the permanent end of our personal existence. A 
more animistic definition would be that death occurs when all our bodily functions have 
seized. There are several philosophical and cultural understandings of what death means. 
For the purposes of this thesis it is particularly important to distinguish between medical 
criteria of death and philosophical definitions of death.  
 
The medical criteria of death most commonly used in Western countries are 
cardiorespiratory death and brain death. Cardiorespiratory (cardiopulmonary) death refers 
to a person’s heart stopping and thus causing death. Brain death is determined as the 
cessation of brain function while a person’s heart is still beating. The brain death criterion 
has been adopted as a criterion of death in 1968 in the United States. The definition of 
brain death that is now commonly used is based on a 1968 report called A Definition of 
Irreversible Coma: Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to 
Examine the Definition of Brain Death.1  
 
 
1 A Definition of Irreversible Coma: Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to 
Examine the Definition of Brain Death. JAMA. 1968;205(6):337–340. 
doi:10.1001/jama.1968.03140320031009 
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Currently, brain death is widely accepted as a legal criterion of death in many countries, 
although its determinations vary. Finland has been one of the forerunners in the use of the 
brain death criterion. Brain death was accepted as a legal criterion of clinical death in 
Finland in 1971.  
 
Organ donation is an inseparable part of the ethical discussion on brain death. Accepting 
the brain death criterion enables procuring organs from a patient while their body is still 
otherwise functional. Since there is almost always a lack of potential organ donors, the 
possibility to harvest organs from brain dead persons offers a valuable possibility to help 
other patients with life-threatening conditions. Of course, there are multiple questions 
related to the ethics of organ transplants. Some of these issues arise on a practical level 
when dealing with various cultural and religious backgrounds of patients and their families.  
 
Although the concept of brain death was introduced decades ago, it has never really been 
agreed upon and it is continuously critically discussed. In 2002, Eelco Wijdicks published a 
study which showed that despite being used in most countries, there is no global 
consensus on defining brain death. (Wijdicks 2002.) A similar study was conducted again 
in 2015, showing that there were still notable differences in practices considering 
perceptions and practices of brain death. (Wahlster et al 2015.) Based on the data 
received from a questionnaire sent to physicians worldwide, the authors state that 
“whether a harmonized, uniform standard for brain death worldwide can be achieved 
remains questionable” (Wahlster et al 2015, 1870).   
 
Recently, Peter Singer has argued that “the evidence now clearly shows that brain death is 
not equivalent to the death of the human organism. We therefore face a choice: either we 
stop removing vital organs from brain dead patients, or we accept that it is not wrong to kill 
an innocent human who has irreversibly lost consciousness” (Singer 2018, 153). He 
mentions Jeff McMahan’s ‘higher brain account’2, according to which humans (and other 
beings with high level of consciousness) can die while our bodies are still alive as 
organisms. Singer writes: “McMahan’s proposal has the merit of not denying that human 
organisms die in the same sense that plants die. Hence it does less violence to the 
 
2 McMahan 1995. 
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common conception of death than other defenses of a move to a higher brain definition of 
death” (Singer 2018, 162).  
 
In short, Singer offers a contemporary, clearly articulated bioethical view on the question 
that has been part of the brain death discussion for decades: is it acceptable to take 
organs from people whose body, apart from the brain, is still alive in order to save other 
people in need? 
 
Singer refers to the case of Jahi McMath, a girl in the United States who was declared 
dead using the brain death criteria. Jahi’s case has attracted a lot of public attention, 
because Jahi’s family refused to accept that she was dead and even more so because 
some medical professionals looked into the case and evaluated that Jahi is not, in fact, 
dead. The case is an example of a situation where not only the family members disagreed 
about the acceptability of the notion of brain death but medical professionals also 
disagreed about whether Jahi in fact was brain dead or not.  
 
Jahi’s case and its bioethical aspects are exhaustively analyzed in a 2018 article by 
Rachel Aviv in the New Yorker3. The article picks up several problems related to brain 
death, one of them being that the concept of brain death is developed by people who 
appreciate intellect and secular scientific views over other believes. It is quite obvious to 
many bioethicists and medical professionals that it can be difficult to make patients or their 
relatives understand or accept medical procedures, because of varying cultural and 
religious beliefs. Doctors might face challenges, for example, if a family does not recognize 
the concept of brain death or they consider withdrawing life support a sin. 
 
Especially when dealing with death, dying and loss, it is crucial to consider not only the 
prevailing philosophical and medical traditions (which also are not permanent, from the 
historical point of view) but to respect people’s beliefs, traditions and personal feelings 
even when they contradict the majority view. The New Yorker article quotes bioethicist 
Alan Weisbard who states that ““minority communities should be forced into a definition of 
death that violates their belief structures and practices and their primary senses” (Aviv 
2018). However, it is important to notice that many minority communities in the Western 
 
3 Aviv, Rachel. What Does It Mean to Die? The New Yorker 29.1.2018, URL: 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/02/05/what-does-it-mean-to-die. 
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countries (who are not minorities elsewhere) do recognize brain death as a criterion of 
death and have no trouble accepting organ donations, as long as they are carried out in a 
respectful manner. For example, an article by Arbour et al. (2012) points out that “Islamic 
scholars and authorities representing all Muslim countries passed a clear fatwa 
designating brain death in 1986” (Arbour et al. 2012, 382-383). Because there are various 
views within minority communities and different religions, cases of brain death and organ 
transplantation need to be addressed with great cultural sensitivity but without making 
generalizations.  
 
Although there are many contradicting views about the brain death criteria, they are all 
concentrated in the medical criteria of death. It is important to distinguish between the 
medical criteria of death and the philosophical definition of death. Philosophy of death 
seems to have revived in the past 20 or 30 years, which means that multiple philosophers 
have examined questions such as what is death, is death a bad thing, should we fear 
death and what is the relation between our personal identity and death. Some interesting 
works on philosophy of death include Death by Geoffrey Scarre, The Philosophy of Death 
by Steven Luper, 10 Good Questions about Life and Death and Annihilation: The Sense 
and Significance of Death by Christopher Belshaw, Well-Being and Death by Ben Bradley, 
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death by Ben Bradley & Fred Feldman & Jens 
Johansson and The Metaphysics of Death by John Martin Fischer.  
 
Let us now move on to briefly scrutinizing the philosophical notions of death. According to 
Thomas Nagel’s definition, death is the “unequivocal and permanent end of our existence” 
(Nagel 2010, 1). Thus, death is bad, because it deprives of life itself. 4 If we define death 
along the lines of Nagel, then death is our permanent end as persons.  
 
From a legal perspective, a person is dead when the crucial brain functions have stopped. 
It is also possible that a person suffers a brain injury that leaves the critical brain functions 
intact in a way that the person does not meet the criteria of brain death. In these kinds of 
cases we are left wondering how much of the individual’s personality and self-awareness 
need to stay intact in order to the person to be alive. Furthermore, we meet the 
 
4 Nagel’s account can be called the deprivation view and I have scrutinized in further in my article 
Considerable Life Extension and the Deprivation View. As I note, the fact that life has intrinsic value does not 
mean we should live as long as possible. 
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metaphysical question of how much of the person needs to remain unchanged in order for 
her to remain the same person. 
 
A braindead person remains the same as before, externally, but they don’t seem to exist 
as a person who they used to be. Regarding this, Nagel provides an imaginary scenario in 
which a smart individual suffers a severe brain injury and turns into a “content infant” 
(Nagel 2010). The content infant does not seem to be the unlucky one. Instead, the person 
that was before has been deprived of something. Thus, the person who existed before the 
brain injury has “died” but a new one has emerged. Yet the person has the same 
appearance and relations to loved ones - these don’t seem to disappear with the brain 
injury, even if the personality becomes unrecognizable.  
 
In his 2013 article Brain Injury and Survival, Walter Glannon examines whether individuals 
who suffer a severe brain injury survive the events that caused them.5 He sums his view 
on survival as follows: 
 
“’Survival’ means that an individual continues to exist as that same individual despite 
changes he or she undergoes from an earlier or later time. If these changes involve a 
permanent disruption in the connectedness or continuity of one’s essential physical or 
psychological properties, then the individual in question ceases to exist.” (Glannon 2013, 
246.) 
 
As he notes, this view pretty much follows Derek Parfit’s view on continuity of identity6. 
Glannon defines two critical questions regarding survival: whether we define people 
essentially as human organisms or as persons and whether we adopt a numerical identity 
or a narrative identity as bases of our existence over time.7  
 
From everyday experience we know that a change in a person’s character does not 
change the way we relate to them. For example, once my grandfather stopped recognizing 
me because of his Alzheimer’s disease and lived in his own world, it was still clear to me 
 
5 Glannon, Walter (2013). Brain Injury and Survival. In Taylor, James S. (2013), ed. Metaphysics and Ethics 
of Death. Oxfor University Press, New York. 
6 See r.g. Parfit, Derek (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
7 Glannon 2013, 246. 
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that he was my grandfather. Family members, friends and others can relate to a person 
through shared memories, feeling of familiarity, touch and appearance, smell, voice, and 
other qualities. However, if there is no possibility for communication left and the prognosis 
is not good (as in the case of brain death), people usually feel much less related to the 
person and are willing to let go.  
 
For his 2015 documentary, Human, French photographer Yann Arthus-Bertrand 
interviewed more than 2000 people around the world about their views on different aspects 
of humanity and life.8 One of the interviewees reflects on his friend’s words from childhood. 
According to his friend, life is like delivering a message from the child that you were to the 
old person you will one day be.9 This can be interpreted in many ways. Perhaps the 
purpose of life, as the interviewee suggests, is to deliver beautiful ideas from childhood to 
old age. But there is also an underlying thought about continuity, a kind of a layman’s 
perspective of the psychological continuity view supported, for example, by Glannon and 
Parfit. What really matters is not so much an individual remaining unchanged over time but 
rather an individual maintaining continuity over time. 
 
One of the most discussed points in philosophy of death is the question whether death is a 
bad thing. Two of the perhaps most famous views on the badness of death are the so 
called Epicurean view and the deprivation view. The Epicurean view is inspired by 
Lucretius. In his words: “Nothing for us there is to dread in death, no wretchedness for him 
who is no more” (Lucretius, On the Nature of Things (III)). According to Epicurus, death is 
not to be feared: the fear of death is irrational. There is no reason to worry about existing 
after death in as if we would exist in some kind of a dark void; after death there is simply 
nothing for us left to experience. Death is the end of our personal experience and thus 
after the moment of death there is no one left to feel anxiety, or pleasure for that matter. 
As Michael Hauskeller has put it, “we will not even be dead, because there will not be 
anyone left to be anything at all” (Hauskeller 2013, 92). 
 
The Epicurean view is often referred to as supporting the idea that death is not bad for us. 
While I will not be one to contradict that assumption, it should be emphasized once more 
 
8 Arthus-Bertrand, Yann (director) (2015). Human. Humankind Production.  
9 Ibid., 2:55:18-2:56:31, translated from Portuguese. 
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that Epicurus was mainly focusing on fear of death. In fact, it is possible to think that while 
there is no reason to be afraid of death, it can still be bad for us. Asking whether we should 
be afraid of things that are bad for us can be separated from asking whether something is 
indeed bad for us. 
 
According to the Epicurean concept of hedonism the main goal of life is to experience 
pleasure and to avoid pain. In the Epicurean view, death is a neutral event and there is no 
afterlife; no punishment to be afraid of and no paradise waiting for us. Thus it is also very 
easily compatible with a predominant Western scientific and secular belief system.  
 
The thought about death as a neutral event that should not be feared is also compatible 
with many religious views. However, religious thinking is generally associated with the 
belief of an afterlife in the form of heaven, hell or reincarnation. In many cases, people are 
encouraged not to fear death, since death is nothing but the will of god and it signifies 
salvation, rest from earthly struggle, permanent peace and reunification with their loved 
ones. On the other hand, many religions suggest that the sinners are doomed to hell, 
which of course makes the prospect of one’s own death much more haunting. Yet the 
images of heaven and hell are something that takes place after death and death is nothing 
but a pit stop on the way to paradise (or damnation, if you’re unlucky). Although secular 
philosophers mostly reject the idea of afterlife they sometimes discuss the possibility of 
becoming immortal through once achievements (such as art or science) or surviving death 
by being good.10     
 
Regardless of whether we accept the philosophical stand that death is nothing to us, in 
everyday discussions we usually refer to death as something negative. If we hear of a 
passing of an elderly neighbor, a famous soccer player, a musician or any fellow citizen, 
we tend to feel melancholic about it. It is generally considered odd if someone’s death 
sparks happy emotions in us. If we hear of a fatal car accident nearby, our first reaction is 
usually some level of shock or grief. When we get up in the morning, many of us are not 
prepared to die. Indeed, it would be considered a great misfortune. If I walk into a lecture 
room and ask how many people would like to die today, the answer is most likely zero.  
 
 
10 For the latter, see Mark Johnston’s 2010 book Surviving Death, in which he argues that there is no 
persisting self and that a truly good person can, in a way, survive death.  
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As Bernard Williams puts it, there are two ways of arguing that death is not necessarily an 
evil; “death is said by some not to be evil because it is not the end, and by others, because 
it is” (Williams 1973, 82). By the former, he is referring to beliefs about afterlife, by the 
latter to the Epicurean view. The Epicurean, or deprivation, view is based on the 
assumption that death signifies the loss of something. As Williams sees it, it is not 
irrational to think that losing one’s loved ones, hobbies, work or other meaningful things in 
life is bad. Instead, it is irrational to think that death itself is bad. (Williams 1973, 84). It is 
crucial to keep in mind that the (Epicurean) view that death is not to be feared is not equal 
to the view that death is a bad thing. Furthermore, it is quite often the case that even 
though someone accepts the Epicurean reasoning, they might still be terrified of death (as 
humans we have many fears that we know not to be rational).  
 
Despite the fact that most people would not like to die at this moment and consider death a 
negative thing, there are also exceptions. If a person is, for example, terminally ill and 
suffering greatly, they might wish for their life to come to an end. Many people commit 
suicide or attempt to commit suicide as a consequence of stress, depression and other 
mental health issues. There are many possible reasons to commit a suicide, including 
shame, honor, and the choice to die before one’s health and understanding will deteriorate 
permanently (such as in case of Alzheimer’s disease or MS).  
 
In 2011, fantasy novelist Terry Prachett appeared in the documentary movie Choosing to 
Die, in which he explored the possibility of assisted suicide motivated by his own 
Azheimer’s diagnosis. He meets individuals who have, or who’s loved one has, taken the 
conscious decision to end their life by assisted suicide. Most cases of euthanasia or 
assisted suicide in medical facilities appear when it’s estimated that the patient has only 
one or two days left to live. However, some people choose assisted suicide as a way to 
exit this life in what they see a dignified way. One such story in the documentary is told by 
an elderly woman whose husband chose assisted suicide due to his Alzheimer’s 
diagnosis. Just before the moment of death, the couple laid down on a bed side by side, 
drank some champagne and sang one of the man’s favorite songs. Without romanticizing 
this kind of decisions, it seems reasonable to ask why this kind of a freely chosen way to 
exit should be morally condemned (I believe it shouldn’t).11   
 
11 Russel, Charliel (director) (2011). Terry Prachett: Choosing to Die. KEO Films. 
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In philosophical literature on philosophy of death, it is typical to reflect on the possible 
moral justification and reasoning behind suicide. In medical ethics, a lot of attention has 
been paid to different aspects of physician-assisted suicide (assisted suicide, euthanasia) 
but due to the extensive number of existing literature on physician-assisted suicide, I will 
not go deeper into the topic in this thesis.  
 
Self-harm is not a prevailing theme in the discussion on life extension (unless it is 
discussed as a way out of immortality) but statistically speaking, suicide is not a marginal 
phenomenon. According to the WHO, approximately 800 000 people die of suicide every 
year. This is close to 1,4 % of all deaths in the world and makes suicide the 17th most 
common cause of death in the world.12  According to the report by Lazaro et al. (2010)13 
carried out as part of the Global Burden of Disease Study 2010, self-harm was the 13th 
most common cause of death globally, leaving behind many types of diseases (such as 
certain types of cancers), accidents (fires, falls) and interpersonal violence. Statistically 
speaking, a person is more likely to die of suicide than as a victim of homicide, by breast 
cancer, leukemia, poisoning or by exposure to forces of nature.      
 
A suicide attempt is not always proof that a person actually wishes to die. For example, it 
may be a cry for help or an impulsive act taken under the influence of drugs or alcohol. A 
suicide (or a suicide attempt) says little about whether the person is scared of dying or 
whether they think that death is bad. At least they seem to feel that death, considering 
their life situation, is the least painful option.  
 
Statistics suggest that contrary to the common idea that people do not wish to die, at any 
given moment there is a significant amount of people willing to end their own life. Whether 
this is a result of physical suffering, mental health issues, a traumatic event, an existential 
pain, societal and social environment (or a combination of all of these) or something else, 
is debatable but does not change the numbers. In conclusion, I want to point out that in 
addition to external threats, many people are actually potential causes of death to 
themselves, which should be considered when discussing eliminating different causes of 
 
12 http://www.who.int/mental_health/prevention/suicide/suicideprevent/en/ 
13 Lazaro et al. (2010). Global and regional mortality from 235 causes of death for 20 age groups in 1990 
and 2010: a systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2010. Lancet 2012, 380; 2095-128. 
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death that affect life expectancy. It is also not as clear as it seems at first sight that people 
prefer life over death.  
 
In general, it is easy to state that ‘either you’re dead or you’re alive” but actually the 
causes, criteria and definitions of death are much more complex than many people might 
think. In practical bioethics and decision-making it is crucial to consider the definition and 
criteria of death before drawing too many conclusions about death and life extension. 
Different understanding of death will produce different understanding of moral rights and 
duties in a society. In the case of considerable life extension, it is important to understand 
whether choosing (a longer) life over death is always as intuitive as it seems at first sight. 
 
2.2 Immortality 
 
Immortality is a source of endless dreams and ambitions in many belief systems in our 
times and before. The search for immortality, the Holy Grail, the elixir of life, and so on, 
has been a continuous source of inspiration for philosophy, religion and literature around 
the world. Historically, definitions of immortality in the philosophical literature have usually 
been quite abstract, referring to a mystical possibility of being immune to death. 
Immortality is often presented as a person remaining a certain age through time.  
 
The terms ‘immortality’ and ‘immortals’ have also been used in the more recent bioethical 
discussion on life extension. Although understandable, I think this kind of rhetoric in the 
debate on considerable life extension is not useful because it leads us to think of 
something that we are not actually talking about.14 Note that I do not believe that this 
means that the discussion on immortality is not important or interesting in a more general 
philosophical sense.      
 
Let us look at some philosophical definitions of immortality. Outside bioethics, 
philosophers are more interested in the metaphysical questions related to immortality and, 
unlike in most cases of contemporary bioethics, there is no need for contemplating on 
 
14 This view is further explained in my paper Considerable Life Extension versus Immortality that can be 
found at the end of this book. 
14 
 
realistic prospects of medicine and technology. Plato believed in the immortality of the 
soul. For him, death is a path to afterlife and thus also a new beginning. Contrary to this, 
Epicurus firmly believed that death is the permanent end of human existence and 
experience. James Warren, for one, has pointed out that according to the so called 
Epicurean views immortality is not a desirable goal. In his words, “the Epicureans are 
explicit in their claims that there is nothing desirable in immortality. Life is not made worse 
for the fact that it will come to an end: mortality per se is not lamentable” (Warren 2004, 
110). But as Warren also notes, some scholars do not see this as obvious. As Ted 
Honderich, to whom Warren refers, puts it, we want (to continue) living just because of 
living itself.15 Personally I’m inclined to think along the lines of Honderich here; it is not only 
the fear of death that may make people pursue an extended life.  
 
There is a difference between fearing death and wanting to live more just for the sake of 
the intrinsic, primitive value that being alive has for human beings. Nagel refers to by 
stating that when given the choice between dying now and living for another week, he 
would always choose to live another week, even though he is not per se excited to live 
forever. Thus, he concludes, he seems to want to live forever. (Nagel 1986, 224.)  
 
Michael Hauskeller has noticed the same issue and points out that when asked, most 
people do not want to die. But its is entirely possible and even likely that the very same 
people do not wish to live forever, either. As Hauskeller points out, there does not exist an 
extensive quantitative research on attitudes on considerable life extension. Although not 
scientific, the answers that he has received from his colleagues and audience indicate that 
people are not inclined to live forever even when they do not wish to die. (Hauskeller 2013, 
90-91.) I have had very similar, yet also not scientific, results when talking to different 
audiences around the world about considerable life extension. I agree with Hauskeller that 
“we cannot infer from the fact that they do not want to die that they do want to live forever” 
(Hauskeller 2013, 90-91). I also agree with him completely that from this statement it does 
not follow that considerable life extension would be bad, wrong or ethically undesirable. 
(Hauskeller 2013, 91.)  
 
 
15 Warren 2004, 110, footnote. Warren refers specifically to Honderich (2002). 
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In The Oxford Handbook on Philosophy of Death (2013), John Martin Fischer makes some 
useful distinctions considering immortality. He distinguishes between “actually living 
forever (but with the possibility of dying) and necessarily living forever (that is, living 
forever without the possibility of dying)” (Fischer 2013, 337). Fischer thus distinguishes 
between contingent and necessary immortality. He also notes that we can separate 
between an individual knowing and not knowing about one’s (necessary or contingent) 
immortality.  
 
Fischer makes a further distinction between what he calls immortality involving ‘serial’ lives 
(such as Hindu and Buddhist believes) and non-serial lives as well as non-atomistic 
conceptions of immortality (and individual fusions with other individuals) and atomistic 
concepts of immortality. (Ibid.) Fischer understands immortality mostly as bodily 
immortality, which is also my approach in this thesis. He notes that in the case of bodily 
immortality it is usually assumed that the body stays in some specific condition, for 
example a healthy 40-year-old’s condition, instead of deteriorating. This is a typical way of 
thinking in contemporary bioethics.  
 
In her book Aging, Death, and Human Longevity (2003), Christine Overall defines 
immortality as “the absence of any permanent end to individual personal life and as the 
unending and eternal persistence of individual awareness, perception, thought, emotion, 
and activity through infinite temporal duration” (Overall 2003, 124-125). Just like Overall, 
most philosophers approach death and immortality in relation to personal experience. In 
moral philosophy, mere biological existence does not seem to fulfill the criteria of 
immortality we are interested in: for death or the absence of it to have meaning for us, we 
need to be able to experience it.  
 
There are some species that seem to have the capability to live on and on, even eternally. 
Of course an individual organism faces some kind of a cause of death sooner or later. 
However, the existence of such species reveals that some organisms have a chance of so 
called ‘biological immortality’ (similar to what Fischer would call contingent immortality). 
There are views that claim that death has been introduced by evolution and has not 
always been a necessary part of biological organisms’ life.16 
 
16 For further literature on the biology of aging, see for example Rose, Michael (2004). Biological Immortality. 
In The Scientific Conquest of Death. Essays on Infinite Lifespans, edited by Immortality Institute, Libros En 
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This can be a useful starting point for many scientific studies. The reason why we should 
not get overly excited, or terrified depending on our view, about this in terms of human 
longevity is that biological immortality is found in species that are not as complex and do 
not have a high level of consciousness like humans, such as Turritopsis Nutricula, a type 
of an amoeba.  
 
Let us go back to the definitions of immortality that Fischer makes. Some of the types of 
immortality that Fischer describes can be criticized of not being immortality in the first 
place. If we accept the view that immortality means not being mortal, then every option 
that includes (the possibility of) mortality seems not to be immortality by definition. As this 
is the case, I think it is also useful to distinguish between immortality and eternal life, 
because – theoretically – modest or biological “immortality” gives you the potential to live 
eternally but does not exclude the possibility of death occurring in one way or another.   
 
Even if it’s not clear that people are willing to be immortal or even live extremely long, 
philosophers often refer to immortality as a goal that people desire. They also bring up 
many questions and critical remarks. In his well-known piece The Makropulos Case: 
Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality (1973), Bernard Williams expresses the worry 
that immortality would be tediously boring. More than that, he explicitly expresses the view 
that we are better off being mortal. He writes: “Immortality, or a state without death, would 
be meaningless, I shall suggest; so, in a sense, death gives the meaning to life” (Williams 
2013, 82). As he stresses, this does not mean that death could not, or should not, be 
considered as evil or that there could be no reasons to fear death. (Ibid.)     
 
Most of the time people who don’t share William’s intuition of possibly getting bored come 
up with a list of interesting things that could fill the extremely long, or even eternal, life and 
make it feel worth living. Boredom occurs in different situations for different people. It does 
not make a lot of sense to say that in order not to be bored, we need to follow a certain 
path in life in terms of activities, relationships, career and so on. Someone might say that 
in order not to get bored, they would need to be professional athletes, have multiple 
romantic and sexual relationships, party and travel the world. Someone else might say that 
 
Red, Rose, Michael (1991). Evolutionary Biology of Aging. Oxford University Press, New York. or Clark, 
William C. (1999). A Means to an End: The Biological Basis of Aging and Death. Oxford University Press, 
New York. 
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they would love to spend time with their partner and kids doing volunteer work in the local 
animal shelter, preferably staying in their small hometown. In general, we might say that 
for a person not to get bored, they need to be able to lead a life that is interesting and 
satisfying for them.  
 
There is a further question to be raised about boredom, though. The question is whether a 
life needs to be interesting to be worth living. Or, in other words, whether a life needs to be 
interesting in order to be preferred to death. Boredom can be tedious and we all recognize 
the saying ‘bored to death’. But no matter how bored we are, would we rather die than be 
bored? Aubrey de Grey has quoted Brian Kennedy, former CEO of the Buck Institute for 
Research on Aging, on boredom. Kennedy has said that if he had a choice between being 
bored at 150 and getting Alzheimer’s at age 80, he chooses being bored.17 I assume that 
many people will find this answer intuitive. 
 
Norwegian philosopher Lars Svendsen has written about boredom in his book, A 
Philosophy of Boredom (2005). Many authors have accepted William’s view about 
immortality as boring as an argument against immortality, whether they agree with 
Williams or not. Boredom seems to be accepted as something bad among most 
philosophers writing about considerable life extension. In other words, most people focus 
on arguing that immortality (or a radically extended life) would not be boring instead of 
arguing that boredom is not necessarily a bad thing. Intuitively, as Kennedy’s quote points 
out, boredom seems to be a minor inconvenience compared to death. However, this 
depends on how we define boredom.    
 
Svendsen refers to a typology of boredom by Martin Doehlemann. It defines four different 
types of boredom:   
 
“situative boredom, as when one is waiting for someone, is listening to a lecture or taking 
the train; the boredom of satiety, when one gets too much of the same thing and 
everything becomes banal; existential boredom, where the soul is without content and the 
world is in neutral; and creative boredom, which is not so much characterized by its 
content as its result: that one is forced to do something new. (Svendsen 2005, 41)” 
 
17 https://nationalpost.com/feature/do-you-really-want-to-live-foreverish 
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The four types can overlap but are still clearly separate. Without going deeper in 
distinctions between different types of boredom, it seems clear that Williams is talking 
about some type of an existential boredom. Svendsen writes that boredom is related to 
death and even that “profound boredom is like some sort of death” (Svendsen 2005, 40). 
In the case of a kind of existential boredom, it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish 
it from depression and unwillingness to live. However, boredom escapes a fixed definition 
and is perhaps not as clearly bad as it has been considered to be. Understood differently, 
occasional boredom can also be a catalyst and even a requirement for human creativity 
(creative boredom). But perhaps boredom in such cases is understood more as idleness 
instead than as existential pain or meaningfulness.  
 
Despite obviously not being able to solve the problem here, I believe it’s worthwhile to 
notice that boredom can be understood in many ways, all of which are not negative. There 
is also a further question related to how boredom comes about. Let us imagine an 
extremely long life that is intolerably boring at a time x, let’s say around 500 years. We can 
then ask whether the intolerable boredom is an intrinsic property of a long life or is it rather 
something that we can prevent from emerging or only emerges at certain times. Surely we 
all have had boring periods in our lives, followed by less boring times. People go through 
tediously meaningless-feeling episodes of life (sometimes even resulting in attempts to 
end their own life) just to find themselves enjoying life later.    
 
This chapter has provided a brief overview on the concept of immorality as a philosophical 
concept. It is by no means exhaustive nor meant as such. Immortality can be defined in 
numerous different ways. Fischer has distinguished between contingent (having the 
possibility of living forever. other things being equal) and necessary immortality (being 
immortal). Some species seem to have the theoretical possibility to live forever but they 
are still prone to die due to different reasons. The same would apply to humans were 
extremely long life possible. Many philosophers, among them Nagel and Hauskeller, have 
noticed that the questions related to the badness of death and willingness to live long 
seems to come to a paradox: people do not usually want to die at any given moment but 
they also do not want to live forever. I agree that this is a central philosophical problem 
related to considerable life extension. However, from the paradox it does not automatically 
follow that life extension would be ethically undesirable. 
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 3. Connections to Thanatology 
 
Thanatology is a field that studies death as a phenomenon from various academic 
perspectives. The name is derived from the Greek word thanatos, death. Thanatology is 
interdisciplinary by nature and concentrates on issues such as death and healthcare, 
palliative care, cultural manifestations of death, rituals of death and dying, loss and 
mourning, history of conceptions of death, funeral ceremonies, and so on. Philosophical 
questions related to death can be considered as a part of thanatology due to their topic. 
The philosophical issues vary from metaphysics of death to practical ethical and bioethical 
questions. Many research topics in thanatology are closely related to bioethics and 
especially medical ethics, since death often takes place in medical surroundings. The 
medical issues include ethics of euthanasia and assisted suicide, palliative care, care of 
the elderly and organ transplantation. These questions often consider the personal and/or 
professional choices of the medical staff, the patient, and the patient’s loved ones. Other 
thanatology studies often focus on societal arrangements.  
 
In this chapter, I will briefly present the main areas that I think combine my study and 
thanatology. For the sake of clarity, I will present the combining questions in three 
separate areas. I have adopted the division from the book Kuoleman kulttuurit Suomessa 
(Cultures of Death in Finland)18, an anthology of thanatology published in 2014, although I 
have taken to liberty to just borrow the three headlines instead of following the book’s 
content otherwise in any strict sense. The three areas of focus are (1) the good death, (2) 
the communal death and (3) the irreversible death.19    
3.1 The Good Death 
 
What is a good death? This question is relevant in many fields besides philosophy, such 
as nursing sciences and medicine, especially in palliative and terminal care. The question 
is, obviously, closely related to the discussion on euthanasia and assisted suicide. For 
 
18 I have used this anthology by Finnish experts as an example of a recent collection that gathers 
thanatology studies from different fields.  
19 Hakola, Outi & Kivistö, Sari & Mäkinen, Virpi (2014). Kuoleman kulttuurit Suomessa. Gaudeamus, 
Helsinki. Translations are my own. 
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some, the very notion of a “good death” might seem like a paradox. Admittedly, we often 
see death as a bad thing. But by “good death” we actually often seem to refer to “good 
dying” than the actual badness of death. A good death for an elderly person, for example, 
may be one that is peaceful and painless and where support is available from medical 
personnel and loved ones. Yet this does not mean that it is a good thing as such for the 
person to die.   
 
Let us say that we accept the notion of a good death as a death that is, briefly put, free of 
extreme physical and mental suffering, including a certain acceptance of the approaching 
death and the support of people around you. A further question is can such good death be 
brought about by helping someone to die. In this thesis, I have mainly excluded questions 
of euthanasia and assisted suicide from now on. This choice is made based on the 
complex nature of the discussion and the large number of existing professional 
publications on the issue. I will not aim to take a stance, for example, on the moral 
permissibility of assisted dying or questions related to autonomy considering end-of-life 
decisions.  
 
Thanatological studies approach the goodness of death in various ways. Many studies 
concentrate on the experience of dying people or caretakers, aiming to understand what 
factors in a facility, for example, might alleviate the fear and anxiety caused by dying. 
There are also various studies that aim to understand death-related phenomena such as 
near death experiences. Although these types of experiences have often been labelled as 
pseudoscience, they attract a fair amount of academic interest and open new viewpoints to 
death and dying.     
 
3.2 The Communal Death 
 
Although we can never truly experience how another individual feels when they are dying, 
we experience a variety of emotions in when death takes place around us. Death is a 
communal phenomenon that is present in every culture, religion and time where there are 
human beings. Death is typically met with a variety of rituals. 
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It has often been said that death is a taboo in the Western societies. This is a common, 
although perhaps not a scientific, notion. In my own work, mostly in Finland, I have 
experienced otherwise. Even though death is a difficult and personal issue to approach 
and it is definitely not a topic for small talk (unless you happen to be in a thanatology 
conference), people seem to be quite willing to hear about death and to share their own 
views and experiences. What strikes me to be a bigger problem than death being a taboo 
for individual people is that there are no obvious rituals to handle loss and death, nor 
places to speak of death and the anxiety and mystery surrounding it.   
 
Indeed, thanatology research suggests that, for example in the Finnish society, we have 
already moved beyond the biggest taboo period in some senses. For example, seeing the 
body of your loved one is considered to be good as it is a part of accepting death and the 
mourning process.20 Yet there seems to be no return to the old traditions such as keeping 
the body of your loved one at home in an open casket and washing the body at home. 
When the rituals of death move from home to clinical environments, people are distanced 
from death in its most physical forms. The body, and in cases of illnesses the person 
before dying, is faced and taken care of by professionals.21    
 
Thanatology researchers have pointed out that the so called social death that used to take 
place after the bereavement, can nowadays often take place before the actual death. For 
example, Kaarina Koski writes that in our society, medicine has overridden ritualization as 
our primary way to control death.22 Whereas in pre-industrial societies death is often 
sudden and requires psychological adaptation as well as rearranging life at home and 
work after death, in many affluent, industrialized societies the social death happens prior to 
death. The stage when an individual is considered (socially) not living but not yet 
completely dead, either, is also called the liminal stage. The extended periods of time that 
many people spend in hospices before they die gives the people close to the dying person 
time to get accustomed to the absence of the dying individual. It is not rare, despite of 
sorrow and loss that follows death, that death in such circumstances is described as a 
relief. 
 
 
20 Pajari 2014, 100.  
21 Pajari 2014, 100.  
22 Koski 2014, 108. 
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As a general notion one might say that during the 20th century, people in Finland and 
similar societies have been detached from the physicality of death and traditional rituals 
have lost some of their meaning and/or changed. But, as opposed to the development that 
peeked somewhere after WWII, the recent trend seems to be accepting death but in a 
rather abstract manner. As Ilona Pajari also suggests, nowadays the way we deal with 
death tends to be focused on how we deal with death and dying on a spiritual, 
psychological and emotional level.23    
 
3.3 The Irreversible Death 
 
Regardless of how we perceive the social meaning of death, how we deal with emotional 
loss and what kind of rituals we follow, one thing does not change: we all die. From the 
medical point of view, death occurs when an individual’s vital cardiovascular activity or 
brain function stops for good. It is not clear what death is. In medicine, clear indicators are 
needed to announce death but that does not mean that those indicators are not culture-
dependent or changeable. In biology, death is generally seen more as a process than as a 
single event. Also, the focus is not only on the death of a human individual.   
 
Biology does not give any simpler answer to what death is. In fact, quite the contrary. From 
the biological viewpoint, death is a process that has many stages and not a clear 
beginning and end. Death does not refer only to the death of humans and non-human 
animals but also to death of any biological organisms such as cells. Cell death takes place 
in the human body when we age or when we are affected by certain diseases. But it is also 
an ongoing process in a healthy, vital body. As biologist Seppo Vainio puts it, without 
death there would be no life.24  Biology research is essential in terms of understanding 
senescence and, perhaps, for manipulating the aging process. It also helps to understand 
the functioning of the cells and might enable regenerating them in a way that could enable 
considerable life extension in the future.  
 
 
23 Pajari 2014, 122. 
24 Vainio 2014, 188. 
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When an individual organism dies in nature, it gives life to others as the body is consumed 
by other animals, insects and bacteria. This also happens after a burial, although in many 
countries and cultures most dead bodies are cremated rather than buried in a casket. 
There is some beauty in thinking that a physical body continues its journey in another 
physical (although unconscious) form by literally giving life to other species. However, 
many people believe that there is a lot more in life after death. This usually means 
believing to the afterlife in the sense that the person’s awareness (soul, spirit) remains 
untouched. The most common view of resurrection is some kind of a variation of the 
immortality of the soul in this sense. In some cases, such as in the case of some Jewish 
movements, a belief in physical resurrection has been adopted.25   
 
Thanatology is an interdisciplinary field but it can provide valuable insights to philosophical 
questions related to considerable life extension. Thanatological research can help in 
pointing out crucial ethical problems that are faced by physicians, nurses, decision-makers 
and other professionals. Thanatology can also help philosophers to understand the cultural 
and personal challenges related to death and dying. Perhaps the most valuable lessons 
that one might learn, as a philosophy researcher, from working with professionals from 
other fields is that death is not only an abstract phenomenon but an ever present element 
in our culture and beliefs as well as a personal experience. Death and dying are 
experienced differently by each person. Yet thinking about these things makes all of us 
vulnerable, insecure and thoughtful and may evoke painful or agonizing memories. Thus, 
these matters deserve to be treated with respect and a high sensitivity to people’s real life 
experiences.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 See for example Ketola 2014, 167. 
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4. Connections to Bioethics 
 
This chapter is an overview on what is the relation of the ethical discussion on life 
extension to a more general bioethical discussion. The question is not easy to answer, 
since bioethics is a vast field and can be defined in numerous ways. In this part, I will look 
at five different themes that are some of the main connections between considerable life 
extension and bioethical discussion. These are: theory and practice, human enhancement, 
population issues, humans and non-humans and issues related to just distribution. 
 
Bioethical questions are related to healthcare, medicine, and policy-making. Careful 
bioethical research helps developing and implementing considerable life extension 
interventions that serve to improve the length and quality of individual lives without 
compromising the general interests of the current societies or future generations. Of 
course, a possible outcome of ethical evaluation is also that considerable life extension is 
not desirable in the first place. The topic is not only of philosophical interest but also of 
societal importance.    
 
4.1 Theory and Practice  
 
Bioethics is both a part of philosophy and an interdisciplinary discipline. I will focus on 
philosophical bioethics as a subfield of ethics, not as an interdisciplinary field covering 
nursing sciences, cultural studies, and so on. However, it is not as simple as that to 
separate between bioethics as solution-seeking method for practical ethical problems and 
bioethics as a theoretical tool. Most of the time, in fact, it seems to be something in 
between. This is both a blessing and a curse, so to speak, for bioethics. John Arras uses 
the term mid-level theorizing in relation to bioethics.26 The nature of such theory is to 
concentrate on a practical ethical problem without necessarily relying heavily on a moral 
background theory. This makes such theorizing suitable for practical ethicists 
 
26 Arras, John, "Theory and Bioethics". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2013 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/theory-bioethics/>. 
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(bioethicists), especially when dealing with societal issues that require quick response 
from, for example, academics, decision-makers or healthcare professionals.  
 
As Arras writes, “this kind of theorizing is both unavoidable and indispensable in a field like 
bioethics, and it has done much to clarify and advance often heretofore muddled public 
debates; but it need not claim allegiance to any particular denomination of high moral 
theory” (Ibid.). 
 
For philosophy researchers, one of the obvious challenges of bioethical decision-making is 
the same as its strength; the possibility to reason without a solid moral background theory 
or without knowledge in the field of philosophy. However, most political decision-making is 
made based on very little expectations of philosophical competence. Decisions are mostly 
made by people who have no professional knowledge in philosophy or no time to look into 
a complete moral theory. This is true, as Arras says, for people such as healthcare 
professionals, academics or decision-makers. (Ibid.) In addition, decisions about resource 
distribution, life-threatening situations, new technologies, legislative changes and other 
issues are typically made under very strict schedules, political pressure and often also 
under the public eye. Based on this, I think mid-level theorizing is also a viable approach to 
decision-making regarding (potential) medical solutions, technologies or policies related to 
considerable life extension 
 
As Dien Ho puts it, “the gap between theories and application exists because ethical 
theories often make competing recommendations and we do not know which theory we 
ought to use” (Ho 2015, 289-296). A quite traditional way of ethics education is to provide 
an overview on different ethical theories (utilitarianism, deontology, and so on). For 
medical professionals, for example, to make a decision about ethics would require a quite 
fundamental understanding of different ethical theories and how to apply them. Simply 
being aware of existing moral theories might not make it easier to navigate toward a 
solution. This is especially true in everyday clinical decision-making. In addition, making 
ethical decisions can be even more challenging to others than, say, medical doctors or 
other professionals who have had some training in ethics. Nevertheless, people 
everywhere need to make decisions considering their health and quality of life without 
being particularly prepared for them. 
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Ho introduces the Default Principle (DP). According to DP, a person is permitted to 
perform action they wish to in the absence of compelling reasons not to perform it. 
Although the principle has some limitations, it is appealing in its capability to provide 
ethical solutions without diving too deep in ethical background theories. It relies heavily on 
logical reasoning and requires some shared beliefs but as Ho says, the beliefs can be 
quite simple, such as the belief that we should act in a way that does not cause more 
suffering in the world. 
 
To be able to negotiate about ethical issues without using exhaustive ethical theories is 
necessary in teaching and applying clinical ethics and other types of practical ethics. I 
believe it is necessary in many cases considering considerable life extension, since many 
life-extending medical decisions are, and will be, made in clinical surroundings and an 
extremely long life will most likely be a result of multiple decisions regarding treatment, 
preventative measures and technologies.   
 
4.2 Human Enhancement 
 
Based on philosophical publications during the past decade or so, the most obvious 
common ground for the ethics of life extension and bioethics in general is the discussion 
on human enhancement. Human enhancement refers to, briefly put, the effort of 
enhancing human capabilities beyond average or “normal” levels. Mainly because of this, 
enhancement has often been opposed with treatment. Unlike medical care, enhancement 
aims beyond perceiving normal level of functioning. As I write in one of my articles, “Is 
Considerable Life Extension an Enhancement?”, I do not believe that the logical 
connection between enhancement and considerable life extension is mandatory, although 
numerous philosophers, such as Harris, Savulescu and Bostrom, have discussed life 
extension in the realm of enhancement.  
 
As the enhancement debate is full of disagreements about the definition of central 
concepts (such as enhancement itself) it is not useful to discuss life extension in the 
context of human enhancement if it is not necessary. Quite contrary, the enhancement 
debate becomes an unnecessary philosophical burden at times. In other words, while I 
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definitely recognize the value of the topics discussed within the enhancement debate, I’m 
doubtful whether the context of enhancement is necessary in the case of considerable life 
extension. 
 
4.3 Population Issues 
 
One of the most common worries people bring up while discussing life extension is some 
kind of a problem related to population issues. As the world is already overpopulated, how 
are we going to survive if people start to live beyond 150, even for hundreds or thousands 
of years? There is also a worry about the faith of future generations. Are we allowed to 
extend our own life at the price of consuming valuable, scarce natural resources? When 
there is simply no room for everyone, is it not right to give more people the chance to 
simply live instead of giving a few people the chance to live for hundreds of years? Many 
of these questions stem from views that are anthropocentric by nature. If we consider the 
best interest of non-human nature, it is not at all clear that we have a right to extend our 
life that seems to inevitably abuse non-human nature.27  
 
There are a few suggestions to answer this critique. One possible approach is simply to 
question the empirical factors and thus the basic premise of the critique. Even though 
there would surely be a temporarily peak in the number of human beings on Earth, we do 
not actually know how, exactly, life extension would affect our reproductive mechanisms or 
other things. Perhaps people who lived to 1500 would reproduce accordingly, having 
children at the average age of 300 instead of 30. This way, we would create less of a 
burden for the environment. Some philosophers have also considered the possibility of 
rationing reproduction in order to avoid extreme population growth. Or, perhaps, longevity 
would be conditional: if you are willing to have children, you should limit the length of your 
own life or vice versa.  
 
Although the before mentioned suggestions seem logical, they are hardly appealing in real 
life. Despite the fact that China, for one, has managed to keep population growth 
somewhat under control by limiting the number of children, a law of limiting reproduction 
 
27 See chapter 4.4 for further discussion on non-human beings and life extension. 
28 
 
would hardly pass without severe resistance in many countries. Contemporary liberal 
democracies are built on the ideal of personal freedom and individuality and are often not 
ready to accept limitation of these values that are considered fundamental. On the other 
hand, in communities where the culture holds a big family in high value, the number of 
children might be a matter of honor and even a measure for success in life, womanhood or 
fatherhood, and so on. There are still many areas in the world, where contraception is 
conceived as too private to talk about, or even as a sin. Obviously, birth control is an issue 
related to religious views, which, in itself, makes it a controversial topic for public 
discussion. The limitation in reproducing, or an effort to force people to use contraception, 
could be seen by some as a violation of their basic religious or moral rights.      
 
The problem of overpopulation has been named by John K. Davis, for one, as the 
‘Malthusian objection’ after Robert Malthus’s famous theory of Malthusian catastrophe.28 
Davis argues that despite being a valid and severe worry, the Malthusian objection is not, 
in itself, a good enough reason to object development of considerable life extension. 
Gustaf Arrhenius has provided a more technical approach on the population issue by 
comparing replacement and life extension in the context of population ethics. 29 
 
4.4 Humans and Non-Humans 
 
There exists a surprisingly small amount of literature around the topic of considerable life 
extension and environmental philosophy.30 Even worries about overpopulation are mostly 
centered around the possible effects on human wellbeing. The fact that ethical discussion 
is centered around human life extension is not surprising given the anthropocentric nature 
of our worldview in general. Human life extension is considered morally more valuable 
than extending the lives of non-human beings (which, biologically, would probably be at 
least as possible as extending human lives). Whether this is because most philosophers 
 
28 Malthus, Thomas (1998 edition). An Essay on the Principle of Population. Electronic Scholarly Publishing 
Project. Originally published in 1798. 
29 “Life Extension versus Replacement”, in Ruud ter Meulen, Julian Savulescu, Guy Kahane (eds.) 
Enhancing Human Capacities, Wiley- Blackwell, 2010. 
30 Another tradition that seems to be absent in the discussion is that of feminist philosophy and most authors 
are men. I thank Markku Oksanen for pointing this out specifically. Unfortunately, this is also a more general 
issue that is true of many fields of bioethics and philosophy in general.  
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think that humans have intrinsic moral value that others do not have or that humans have 
that moral value based on some specific capacity, such as high cognitive skills, it’s hard to 
tell. Anthropocentrism is a typical approach in ethics in general but considering the severe 
possible consequences of considerable life extension to the environment and non-human 
beings, it would be important to maintain this perspective in the discussion. Since 
environmental concerns have gained more and more attention in politics and public 
discussion, it is likely that the environmental issues related to life extension will be more 
carefully taken into account in the future. 
 
I believe that non-human animals have moral value and they should be treated 
respectively.31 But even if one disagrees about the moral value of non-human beings, the 
comparison between humans and non-humans raises an interesting issue related to 
considerable life extension. If we believe that life extension should be available only for 
humans, why is that? Perhaps it is because we believe that humans, unlike most animals, 
are capable of appreciating the alleged benefits of a long life just as we are able to 
appreciate healthcare and technology in general. More precisely, we have self-awareness 
that allows us to appreciate the prospects of staying alive until 500 compared to 50 
(although clearly not all humans appreciate the idea of living extremely long).  
 
A cat, for example, can be content every day for a 500 years if it manages to get its needs 
satisfied. A content cat who lived to see 500 might be happier at each moment than a 
human living to 500. However, most non-human animals do not have the capacity to grasp 
their own mortality, make plans for the future or fear for it. It feels peculiar to think that the 
cat would be more entitled to a long life than me. Perhaps this is due to human capacity of 
fearing death and, on the other hand, loving life and being able to have expectations for 
the future.  
 
Humans seem to have a (at least almost) unique capacity to experience meaning in their 
life, which seems to me to hold more value than joy or happiness. Although the life of a cat 
has moral value and external meaning, it is not meaningful for the cat itself in the same 
 
31 There is no space to argue for this view here but I have defended this view since I wrote my Master’s 
Thesis titled The Moral Value of Non-Human Beings in Mary Midgley’s Philosophy (Eläinten ja 
keinotekoisesti muokattujen olentojen moraalinen arvo Mary Midgleyn filosofiassa, Master’s Thesis in 
Practical Philosophy, Unit of Philosophy, University of Turku, 2011). 
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way that my life is meaningful to me. One could say that extending life is a good thing 
since it allows the extension of meaningful existence for individuals who experience and 
appreciate this meaningfulness, which would exclude at least most non-human beings. 
This intuitive idea also seems to suggest that life extension is the most (or only) morally 
valuable when it can be appreciated by the individual whose life is extended. 
 
4.5 Issues Related to Just Distribution  
 
Philosophers do not agree on the ethical desirability of pursuing considerable life 
extension. Even if they did, many find it controversial that life extension would likely be 
available only for some. At worse, some suggest, this could lead into a situation where a 
population of ‘mortals’ would exist alongside a population of ‘immortals’ (Larry Temkin and 
Leon Kass, for example, have used this terminology). The inequality in this situation is 
clear. It is simply not just to have a population with a possibility to live forever and a 
population with no such opportunity at hand. But despite the logical validity of the worry, it 
is not very realistic if we take it literally. Even if we manage to increase the average life 
expectancy even by thousands of years, it is still not comparable to actual immortality.  
 
However, using the term “immortals” does not necessarily refer to literal immortality (but I 
have argued elsewhere that the terminology can be confusing and personally I would 
avoid using it).32 The fact that life extension can be separated from immortality does not 
erase the problem of inequality. Think about two populations, A and B. Among A, the 
average life expectancy is 90 years. Among group B, the average life expectancy is 140 
years. A 50 year difference in average life expectancy is big and seems to promote 
inequality. However, the difference is not actually so much bigger than the inequalities that 
are present in our world currently (this kind of situation has also been called a longevity 
gap). But this is not an argument for developing life extension technologies without worries 
about equality. Rather, it is an alarming reminder of the blatant inequalities currently 
present in our global community. 
  
 
32 See Rantanen Rosa (2012). “Considerable Life Extension versus Immortality.” Nordicum-Mediterraneum 
2.  
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It is still quite common to make comparisons between the so called first world countries 
and third world countries, rich and poor countries or Western countries and Global South. 
For example, India, Brazil and China are among the wealthiest countries in the world 
(based on GDP). Yet there are also millions of people suffering from extreme poverty in 
these societies and severe human rights violations and organized crime activities occur 
constantly. Also in the European Union and in the United States, many (groups of) people 
live in poverty and lack basic rights. In the globalizing world, the difference between a rich 
person and poor person is painfully clear. However, this does not necessarily apply to the 
difference between rich and poor countries, which is why we should avoid misleading, 
oversimplifying terminology. That is to say, we need to be cautious when talking about 
distribution of medical solutions - such as considerable life extension - in different areas, 
since big differences often exist between different groups of people in a rather small area 
rather than between geographically distant groups.  
 
In bioethics, the question of novelty is never too far. As we noticed, there are several 
worries related to considerable life extension and just distribution. But are they anything 
new compared to issues related to other medical solutions or technologies? Yes and no. 
No, because issues of distributional justice have been explored in the context of numerous 
new technologies. Yes, because no other technological possibility tickles our imagination 
and touches upon the questions of immortality, death and good life in the same way. Yes, 
because life is a fundamental thing, more so than anything else: discussing any kind of 
treatments or enhancements is futile if a person does not have life.  
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5. On the Definition of Considerable Life Extension 
 
In this chapter, I will explain what I mean by considerable life extension. There are, of 
course many ways to extend life. In this thesis, I concentrate on the means of medical 
technologies, whether existing or hypothetical technologies. New and emerging 
technologies include such methods as stem cell therapies, gene modification, telomere 
manipulation, nanotechnologies and so on. However, since a considerable extension of 
our life is not, at least until this day, possible, I will not define the technologies in question 
too strictly. I take considerable life extension to mean living for anything between 150 and 
1000 years, which would require a radical change in the ways we can manipulate the 
aging process.  
 
Within the ethical debate, there are different terms used for extending life. I chose to use 
‘considerable life extension’, since it can refer to different types of life extension. So far 
there is no consistent terminology around the issue so the terms used vary quite a bit 
regardless of people seemingly discussing the same thing. Sometimes people talk about 
radical life extension, lifespan extension, slowing down aging or the possibility of 
immortality or eternal life. I will take a brief look into the definitions of aging, life expectancy 
and lifespan and then move on to briefly discuss some prominent developments in medical 
technology.   
 
5.1 Aging 
 
The biological field specialized in the research of aging is called biogerontology. From a 
biological point of view, considerable life extension is connected to the concept of 
senescence. Senescence is the biological process of aging: it refers to the deterioration 
and eventual death of cells. When an individual deteriorates biologically, death will 
eventually follow due death of cells. That’s why extending human life expectancy and 
human lifespan are two different things.33 Lifespan extension requires a change in the 
biological process that has been part of our species for hundreds, or thousands of years. 
 
33 I will elaborate more on the concepts of life expectancy and lifespan in chapter 5.2. 
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Whether it can happen without using disruptive new technologies is not sure, but new 
medical technologies can definitely be used to (try to) speed up the process. 
 
One of the most prominent and well-known supporters of abolishing aging is Aubrey de 
Grey, who has used slogans such as “aging kills” in order to encourage people to fight 
aging. Although his theories are highly speculative, he has a solid background in science 
and his way of thinking has gained a growing number of followers.34 In the field of 
bioethics, philosophers such as Nick Bostrom have argued strongly for recognizing aging 
as bad.35 
 
Philosophically, it is important to separate between aging and growing old. Even though 
living beings and inanimate objects gets older with each passing moment, they do not 
necessarily age. Let us imagine that my life could be extended considerably: I might stop 
aging at 45 but still live to be 700 years old.  
 
Culturally we attach different attributes to old age than we do to other stages of life 
(childhood - youth - adulthood). We might think that elderly people are wise and 
respectable, for example. Abolishing aging would not only change our biology, but it would 
also mean significant changes in our culture. Leon Kass (2003), for one, has argued that 
we should maintain the ‘natural’ human life cycle instead of trying to get rid of old age. 
Kass’s thinking represents a worry about people ‘playing God’ and intervening with the 
‘natural’ ways of life. 
 
That being said, since people in many countries currently live much longer than a century 
ago and have more time and money, the ideal of old age has already shifted toward a 
more productive, active and creative period of life. Currently many cultures tend to admire 
youth and it seems that this admiration often translates into enthusiasm about anti-aging 
solutions. This applies to what we think of as desirable in terms of appearance and 
activities as well as in terms of societal solutions.  
 
 
34 To learn more about De Grey’s views, see for example De Grey, Aubrey & Rae, Michael (eds.) (2007). 
Ending Aging: The Rejuvenation Breakthroughs That Could Reverse Human Aging in Our Lifetime. New 
York: St. Martin’s Press. 
35 He does so for example in his ‘fable’, see Bostrom, Nick (2005). “The fable of the dragon tyrant”. Journal 
of Medical Ethics 31, 273-277. 
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Aging is generally not considered as something desirable in Western countries. Michael 
Hauskeller has made an interesting observation regarding the badness of aging and 
death. According to him, death is not necessarily an evil and aging is something that helps 
us accept death or prepare for it. Thus he concludes that “ageing is only bad when it does 
not lead to death” and that stopping aging is not a moral imperative as some others have 
claimed (Hauskeller 2011, 30). In his 2002 book Vanhuuden ylistys36, Timo Airaksinen 
seeks to praise and explore old age. As he notes, old age has often been neglected in 
society as an interesting topic, since it is nothing to look forward to or a stage of life that 
you can ever look back to. According to Airaksinen, countries like Finland live in denial of 
old age and death, since nothing protects us from it. (Airaksinen 2002, 135.)  
 
Based on the current bioethical and societal discussion, it seems to me that old age is 
actually a bigger taboo than death. As noted in thesis and elsewhere, philosophy of death 
and death studies have experienced a kind of a revival during the past decades. Many 
people in secular, Western countries might lack the space or the means to talk about 
death in the traditional sense but many seem to be eager to discuss it when given the 
chance. Death and mourning are practised in new ways, for example online.37 Old age, on 
the other hand, is barely discussed and when it is, it is seen as a cost for the society 
(healthcare, retirement plans, hospices) or as something to change (active, youthful old 
age) or defeat (consider De Grey and other trans- or posthumanist thinkers). Whereas 
death is dramatic, aging is deterioration.   
 
Perhaps Hauskeller is right and aging is not a bad thing, since old age prepares us for the 
approaching death. As many philosophers have noted, death without aging seems to be a 
tragedy: consider a death of a child or a death of an adult in a tragic accident. This is a 
challenge for supporters of abolishing aging: how can we learn to come to terms with the 
fact that almost every death is tragic and sudden? However, supporters of abolishing 
aging, such as De Grey, might well say that every death is a tragedy since aging is 
comparable to other terminal illnesses.  
  
 
36 Engl. The Praise of Old Age 
37 See for example Haverinen, Anna (2014). Memoria virtualis - death and mourning rituals in online 
environments. University of Turku.  
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Interestingly, in his recent talk38, De Grey has stated that his institute (SENS) does not 
work for longevity. This is a noteworthy statement someone who is constantly labeled by 
the media, and by many philosophers as well, as some kind of an ambassador for 
biological immortality. De Grey says that he is seen as a kind of a prophet of immortality, 
although he doesn’t “work for longevity, let alone immortality.”  He also states that 
“longevity is a side effect of health” and that although death is sad, he thinks that the 
“suffering before death is more important”. “We are just doing medicine”, he adds. (Ibid.)  
 
Even though De Grey is not a philosopher, I think his words have a huge significance in 
the ethical debate, since he is someone who is constantly referred to in the ethical debate 
as a supporter of longevity.39 Rather, he is aiming to abolish aging, that admittedly comes 
with a lot of suffering, especially when people live longer and longer with aging-related 
diseases (healthy life expectancy is not increasing at the same pace as life expectancy). 
De Grey also states that despite being sympathetic to many transhumanist ideas, he 
doesn’t think there is a strong link between his work and transhumanism and that he 
doesn’t like to be called a transhumanist. He notes that transhumanism and the search for 
biological immortality are much easier to argue against than his actual goal of fighting 
aging and aging-related suffering. (Ibid.) De Grey’s view seems to support the idea of the 
likelihood of life extension being a “side product” of medical and technological 
development and the possibility of humans ending up considerably long whether we want 
it or not.40 This possibility has also been recognized by John Harris, for one. (Harris 2007, 
64.)  
 
5.2 Life Expectancy and Lifespan 
 
Life expectancy and lifespan refer to different things. Whereas life expectancy is an 
estimate of the length of life that is left for a person at a certain time in certain 
 
38 De Grey, Aubrey (2018). “Rejuvenation biotechnology: Will “age” soon cease to mean “aging”?”. A talk 
filmed in Effective Altruism Global 2019 in San Francisco, US. URL: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YgkA9D_cKnE 
39 Obviously, it is a valid question whether he has done much to actively resist this view of himself but I will 
not go further into the politics of that.  
40 See Rantanen, Rosa (2014). “Is Considerable Life Extension an Enhancement?”. Global Bioethics 25, 2; 
103 - 113, p. 110.  
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surroundings, lifespan refers to the expected length of life of a whole species. For 
example, the maximum lifespan of humans is around 120. Unlike life expectancy, lifespan 
has not increased rapidly in the past few hundred years. Instead, more people are living to 
get closer to the maximum lifespan of our species. This means that more people grow old 
and die from aging-related causes.     
 
According to the World Bank’s statistics, in 2017 the average life expectancy in Finland 
was 81 years (which was also the average in EU) whereas in Chad, one of the countries 
with the lowest life expectancy, it was 53. The global average life expectancy in 2017 was 
72 years whereas in 1960 it was barely 53. In 47 years, the global life expectancy 
increased 19 years. The past century must have seen one of the most radical changes in 
human life expectancy in history. If development were to continue at this rate (let’s say, for 
clarity, that the life expectancy would increase 20 years each 50 years), the global average 
life expectancy would be around 90 in 50 years, around 110 in a hundred years and 
around 130 in a 150 years from now.  
 
This vision for the near c future might not be too far off, since the maximum lifespan is 
around 120 years. Yet at the moment it seems unlikely that life expectancy would continue 
to grow after reaching the maximum human lifespan. The increase in life expectancy will 
not be exponential unless we hack the secret of biological aging. On the other hand, the 
development of technology is usually exponential, which would support the likelihood of 
developing scientific solutions that enable manipulating the aging process.  
 
As was noted in the previous chapter (5.1), aging can be a useful and comforting part of 
accepting death. However, as Hauskeller (2011) notes, aging without death seems to be 
bad for us. The idea of a deteriorating body and mind without the prospect of death in sight 
is somewhat dystopian. Yet it has been reality in hospices around the world for decades. 
Whereas the average life expectancy has increased, the so called healthy life expectancy 
(HALE) has not increased accordingly. Let us use Finland as an example. According to the 
WHO statistics, HALE was about 10 years lower than the regular average life expectancy 
in 2016.41 What this means, in general, is that despite the increase in the average life 
expectancy, people live longer times suffering from diseases and ailments related to old 
 
41 http://gamapserver.who.int/mapLibrary/Files/Maps/Global_HALE_2016.png (last visited 2019) 
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age. WHO and other instances have started to measure HALE in addition to life 
expectancy to be able to use quality of life, not just the number of years, as a 
measurement of well-being. Although health and quality of life do not correlate in all cases 
and are complex concepts, it is important to notice that adding years to life may not be as 
important as adding life to years, as the saying goes.  
 
Many statistics about life expectancy express life expectancy at birth. So if the life 
expectancy for someone born in 1960 was 53, it does not mean that their life expectancy 
remained the same: as the politics and technology changed, the life expectancy may 
increase (or decrease, for that matter) notably.  
 
Another basic aspect of statistics is that many statistics express the average (mean) life 
expectancy, whereas the median (the age that half of the population will reach) could be 
more accurate in many cases.42 A high child mortality rate, for example, lowers the 
average life expectancy in country X. Yet the people who live to adult age in the same 
country might have a good chance to live to see old age. For example, if child mortality 
drags the average life expectancy down to, say, 55 years, it does not mean that people 
who grow up to be adults in that country would die at age 55. Therefore the idea that 
hardly no one to old age in certain countries is definitely false. Similar reasoning applies 
when we look at life expectancy historically. In 1760, the life expectancy of Finnish people 
was around 35 years whereas currently it’s around 80 years.43 Even though Finland has 
been torn by war, famine and diseases in the past centuries, it does not mean that no one 
lived to old age.   
 
When people talk enthusiastically about life extension in the context of transhumanism or 
enhancing humans, it may seem that we are looking at an ever-increasing life expectancy, 
since the trend has been that life expectancy keeps rising through the decades. It is 
important to remember that the fact that life expectancy has increased radically does not 
necessarily mean that it will keep rising. There has not been a change in our biological 
potential to live to 120 for centuries despite the increase in life expectancy. Life 
expectancy has increased mostly due to decrease in child mortality. Some important 
 
42 In addition, you can look at the mode (the value that appears the most). 
43 Huttunen, Jussi (2018). Elinikä ja elinajanodote. (Lifespan and life expectancy). Lääkärikirja Duodecim.  
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factors in increasing life expectancy have been things like basic hygiene and healthcare, 
education and decrease in conflicts and famine in many parts of the world.  
 
Even though it is possible that high-tech solutions allow the manipulation of the aging 
process - and thus increase in the human lifespan -, this is not a clear continuation of the 
existing increase in life expectancy. There is a possibility to see the development of life 
expectancy so far and the possible future solutions for manipulating the lifespan as a 
continuum. However, I would argue that it is a false continuum. We are, in fact, talking 
about two different things when we are talking about the extension of life expectancy and 
the extension of human lifespan.  
5.3 Science, Technology and Medicine 
 
There are several technologies that can be used for considerable life extension. In fact, it 
is unlikely that one technology or solution alone will be the key to slow down aging. More 
likely, if considerable life extension will be possible, it will be due to a combination of 
different technologies, medical procedures, pharmaceutics, or other solutions. Means that 
are often mentioned in relation to considerable life extension include nanotechnology, 
stem cell manipulation, gene manipulation, calorie restriction, telomere shortening, 
cryonics and mind uploading. In this thesis I focus on the possibility of extending the life of 
a person in their biological body.   
 
Because science is developing rapidly as we speak, it is impossible to avoid the fact that 
any scientific data presented in this thesis will seem outdated in the future. At the moment, 
there are some indications of the possibility of successfully reversing the aging process on 
mice, for example. It is not clear how this could affect other species. One way to extend 
human life expectancy notably might be regenerative medicine, which “replaces or 
regenerates human cells, tissue, or organs to restore or establish normal function” (Mason 
and Dunhill 2008, 4). Although regenerative has huge potential, replacing dysfunctional 
parts of a human body does not seem to affect whether the body as a whole will enter 
senescence, in which case the process of aging as a whole is not affected.  
 
39 
 
As it may strike as surprising to some that I have not really considered the possibility of 
mind uploading in my articles, I will briefly explain my reasons for doing that. Mind 
uploading refers to a process of converting all the data from a human brain into digital 
information, for example by uploading it on a silicon chip, thus maintaining an individual’s 
life in a digitized form. Among the early pioneers of this field is Ray Kurtzweil who believes 
firmly in the possibility of singularity reached through technology.  
 
It might well be possible to map out our brains and turn this into information that can be 
uploaded to a computer at some point in the future. Yet, in Michael Hauskeller’s words, 
“even if we will manage to emulate a whole brain, we may still find that the hoped for 
effect, namely that the model actually gives rise to subjective awareness, will fail to 
appear” (Hauskeller 2012, 190). Assuming that we do not build a synthetic replica of a 
whole human body around the uploaded mind, can we really expect it to have the same 
type of consciousness as we currently do? Furthermore, it is unclear why we should 
assume that an uploaded mind shares our human experience when lacking the body that 
connects it to the surrounding world by touch, smell, taste, bodily functions, sexuality, 
temperature changes, and so on? It is also very unclear whether we can consider that – 
even in the case the information of my brain is successfully uploaded – the mind that 
would exists in a digitalized form would be the same person as I am or was.    
 
As Hauskeller notes in his article, we have no guarantee that successfully uploading a 
human mind would result in conscious experience as we know it. So far, we have no way 
of knowing if this is true, and it is largely an empirical question. (Hauskeller 2012, 198.) 
The philosophical questions related to mind uploading are largely connected to 
considerations of philosophy of mind and artificial intelligence. They are big questions that 
philosophers have been trying to solve for decades and looking at them would be a project 
worth a whole other Doctoral Thesis. Even though the difficulty of the questions is, of 
course, not a sufficient reason for excluding mind uploading from my thesis, I consider the 
questions related to mind uploading to be of such a different nature than the questions 
related to medical technologies, including both of them would make it very difficult to 
create a coherent study. This, of course, is not to say that questions related to mind 
uploading would not be of great philosophical importance in other ways. 
 
40 
 
Cryonics means preserving an individual in cold temperature over a period of time, 
possibly enabling them to be revived later. Although cryonics has been used to preserve 
humans since the 1960’s, its technical feasibility hasn’t been proved and it remains 
expensive and problematic considering multiple ethical and legal issues. However, Ole 
Martin Moen has recently pointed out that there as long as it is only unlikely, not proven 
impossible, that cryonics will work, it can be considered a rational choice compared to the 
alternatives (cremation, burial). As he puts it,  
 
“It might also be interesting to explore the potential psychological benefits of cryonics. For 
some, fear of death is a significant evil. With the prospect of being cryopreserved, facing 
death might feel less like being dragged to the execution chamber and more like 
embarking on a dangerous journey” (Moen 2015, 681). 
 
I think this is true not only of cryonics but of many transhumanist or posthumanist models 
of thinking, since unknown future prospects provide a feeling of comfort when facing 
mortality. In fact, some transhumanist ideas of the future bear an astonishing similarity to 
religious images of paradise.      
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6. Guidelines for Decision-Making 
 
In this final chapter of the introduction part, I make some suggestions for guidelines that 
can be useful for healthcare professionals, decision-makers, students and researchers in 
different areas. The tools provided in this chapter can be used by anyone interested in the 
topic. The purpose of the guidelines is to help the reader to navigate the ethical discussion 
related to considerable life extension. Using the table that is provided, anyone can situate 
themselves or a specific philosopher, for example, in the ethical field related to the 
discussion about considerable life extension. It also enables seeing different viewpoints in 
relation to each other in a relatively simple way and takes into consideration the difference 
between the first person approach and the third person approach. 
 
6.1 The CLE Table  
 
In order to make it easier to understand the ethical discussion about extended life, I have 
created a tool that I will from now on call the CLE (Considerable Life Extension) Table. The 
CLE Table is meant for mapping out and comparing ethical views about considerable life 
extension based on the ethical desirability of considerable life extension from both an 
individual’s viewpoint (which I call the individual point of view) and from the society’s 
viewpoint (which I call the social point of view). The views of specific philosophers that I 
have used as an example in this chapter are mostly the same that are presented in more 
detail in one of my articles titled Issues in the Ethical Debate on Considerable Life 
Extension. I will start by introducing each sector of the table (table 1). 
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Individual point of view  
 
Social point of view 
 
Ethical obligation to 
promote CLE 
 
It’s an ethical obligation for 
me to pursue CLE 
 
It’s an ethical obligation for 
the society to pursue CLE 
 
Ethical desirability of 
CLE 
 
It’s ethically desirable for 
me to pursue CLE 
 
It’s ethically desirable for 
the society to pursue CLE  
 
Ethical acceptability of 
CLE 
 
It’s ethically acceptable for 
me to pursue CLE 
 
It’s ethically acceptable for 
the society to pursue CLE 
 
Ethical undesirability of 
CLE 
 
It’s ethically undesirable for 
me to pursue CLE 
 
It’s ethically undesirable for 
me to pursue CLE 
 
Ethical obligation to 
prohibit CLE 
 
It’s ethically prohibited for 
me to pursue CLE 
 
It’s ethically prohibited for 
the society to pursue CLE 
 
Table 1: The CLE Table explained. 
 
The individual point of view refers to the beliefs and choices of an individual considering 
purely their own, personal interests. For example, I might want to live very long because I 
enjoy life and have in mind many things that I want to do before I die. The individual point 
of view includes existential and personal concerns that are not typically included in the 
social point of view. As Nagel puts it, it is much easier quite easy to accept that everyone 
will die someday (we are all humans, we all have a limited lifespan, it’s part of the natural 
circle, and so on) but hard to grasp what it means that I will die (I do not understand what it 
means that I will no longer exist, I will not feel any pleasure or pain, I will not see my loved 
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ones, I’m scared, and so on). This is also why we tend to accept that people want to avoid 
dying and keep on living even though it does not always seem to be optimal for us as a 
species or as a society. 
 
The social point of view refers to a society that makes choice considering all of its 
members. It is often a political decision-making process of a state but it can be also 
extended to cover other, smaller or larger scale communities. In moral philosophy, it is not 
always clear what kind of a group of people we are talking about when we are talking 
about collective responsibility. Environmental issues, population overgrowth and human 
rights, for example, are often considered to be a global issue. On the other hand, 
healthcare resources and legislation are often regulated on a national level. In the case of 
Finland, for example, decisions are made in municipal level, national level, EU level and 
on a global level together with other states. What is common in all of those cases and 
relevant for moral philosophy is that decisions are made based on the common good, not 
individual interests. It is possible to have different views about the ethical desirability of 
considerable life extension considering individual and social points of view. Singer (1991), 
for one, has stated that even though living extremely long would be desirable for an 
individual as such, it is not desirable for us as a human species all things considered. 
 
It is important to distinguish between the society’s moral values and the legal practises. 
What is legal is not necessarily morally right and what is illegal is not necessarily morally 
wrong, and vice versa. Thus if the social point of view is that there is an ethical obligation 
to pursue considerable life extension, it does not follow that the society could force its 
members to extend their life. However, a society can decide to use legislative power to 
enforce moral values, which is typically the nature of law. It is particularly important for 
decision-makers to have a clear understanding of their own moral values and the 
prevailing moral values in the society in order to execute politics and legislation that 
promotes those values. 
 
In everyday life, a person rarely has individual preferences that are not related to their 
environment or people around them. The individual point of view is a useful tool in 
evaluating different philosophical stances. I will not define the views in detail outside of this 
context but I am aware that there are numerous different ways of understanding them, 
especially terms such as an ethics and society. Henry Sidgwick, for example, has stated 
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that “Ethics aims at determining what ought to be done by individuals, while politics aims at 
determining what the government of a state or political society ought to do and how it 
ought to be constituted” (Sidgwick 1907, 15). As he puts it, it is the task of the government 
“by laying down and enforcing laws, to regulate the outward conduct of the governed” 
(Sidgwick 1907, 16). I have no intention to criticize Sidgwick’s view but simply to state that 
there are multiple ways to understand the connection between the individual and the 
group, the “governed” and the society.  
 
My view is that the individual point of view view is each individual’s own ethical view and 
the social point of view is the view of ethical thinking of a group of a society. The challenge 
is that it is arguably very difficult to define the latter - in a way it does not exist since the 
society (community, group) is not an entity with a personal relation and emotions about its 
view. It is also not a sum of its members, since societies seek the best possible overall 
solution, not a solution that will perfectly fulfill the ethical preferences of each individual 
member.  
 
Ethical obligation to promote CLE refers to a view that it is a personal (individual) or a 
common (social) strong ethical responsibility to act in a way that promotes considerable 
life extension for oneself (individual) or everyone (social). We can consider Nick Bostrom, 
for example, as a supporter of this obligation regarding both individual and social points of 
view. It is worth noticing that even though he sees it as a moral responsibility to support 
longevity, this responsibility does not necessarily equal forcing someone to live very long. 
It does not follow from the ethical obligation to promote considerable life extension that life 
extension can be forced on the members of the society. However, it is likely that if this 
ethical view is popular enough, it will eventually lead to legislation that pushes people 
towards a certain kind of behavior.  
 
Ethical desirability of CLE refers to a more moderate view, according to which it is 
desirable to pursue considerable life extension. This means that an individual or a society 
is positive about life extension but does not push for a moral obligation to pursue it. As was 
mentioned before, Singer (1991), thinks that considerable life extension is desirable as 
such for the individual. Many authors, including Bostrom, Savulescu and Harris, view life 
extension as ethically desirable from the 3rd person perspective.   
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Ethical acceptability of CLE refers to a more moderate view, namely that an individual or a 
society is more neutral than positive about considerable life extension. The ethical 
acceptability and desirability are both included in believing that considerable life extension 
is an ethical obligation. Yet a person who accepts life extension can also at the same time 
believe that it is ethically undesirable. Believing that considerable life extension should be 
prohibited, on the other hand, collides with accepting it: I can’t both accept and not accept 
something at the same time. The before mentioned reasoning applies within individual 
point of view and within the social point of view. However, as we have seen, a person can 
have different ideas about the status of the ethical desirability of considerable life 
extension in the two different approaches. To clarify, I cannot simultaneously believe that 
is is my personal obligation to both prohibit and promote considerable life extension. 
However, I can believe that it is my personal obligation to promote life extension 
(individual) but that I also accept that the society sees it undesirable (social). 
 
Regardless of their own individual point of view, people can accept that others might find 
life extension desirable or undesirable. It seems that the view that sees considerable life 
extension as ethically desirable and the views that see it as undesirable, can easily coexist 
in a liberal society. As with any matter, the political and legislative process will have to 
define what direction is taken in the practices. This of course entails that the issue is seen 
as something that should or can be regulated by decision-makers. The view that sees 
considerable life extension as ethically acceptable faces more challenges with the extreme 
view, i.e. with the views that promoting or prohibiting life extension is an ethical obligation. 
However, the real test for the society is not the existence of varying moral views but rather 
a situation where extremely different ethical views collide in decision-making.  
 
Ethical undesirability of CLE means that someone accepts considerable life extension but 
does not see it as desirable for themselves (individual) or the society (social). Walter 
Glannon has stated that “there are biological and moral reasons to carefully consider the 
implications of exploiting this [life extension] technology on a broad scale to extend the 
lives of people in the present and near future” (Glannon 2002, 339). Harris and Holm have 
named this view as “precautionary”. (Harris and Holm, 2002, 355) 
 
Ethical obligation to prohibit CLE is the belief that a person has an ethical obligation to act 
in a way that aims to prohibit considerable life extension. One reason for this might be, for 
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example, that a person sees life extension by medical means as “playing God” or as 
interfering in nature’s order. Leon Kass (2003) has argued against life extension both for 
individuals (individual) and societies (social). This also implies, from society’s point of view, 
that resources should not be directed to advancing the development and distribution of 
(possible) life extending methods.   
 
I have now presented an overview on the different concepts in the table. I have mentioned 
a few philosophers by name, mostly in relation to my article “Issues in the Ethical Debate 
on Considerable Life Extension”. The table can be seen as a more sophisticated attempt 
to understand different views in relation to each other and as a more efficient ethical tool 
for decision-making. For the sake of clarity and providing an example, I have situated 
names of authors mentioned in the article in the table (Table 2).44 This is by no means a 
complete picture of ethical discussion related to life extension, since it includes only a few 
names. According to this example, the table can be used to situate and views of other 
philosophers, or anyone, in it. This will help to clarify the discussion related to considerable 
life extension and review the different approaches in relation to each other. The table can 
also be used in mapping out one person’s, including one’s own, ethical view. This can be 
done simply by evaluating one’s own view in each sector.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44  It might help the reader to use the article alongside this table.  
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Individual point of view 
 
Social point of view 
 
Ethical obligation to 
promote CLE 
 
Bostrom 
 
Bostrom 
 
Ethical desirability of 
CLE 
 
Harris, Nagel 
 
Harris 
 
Ethical acceptability of 
CLE 
Nagel, Harris, Singer, 
Davis 
Nagel, Harris, Singer, 
Davis 
 
Ethical undesirability of 
CLE 
 
Kass, Callahan 
 
Singer, Davis  
 
Ethical obligation to 
prohibit CLE 
 
Kass 
 
Kass  
 
Table 2: Assumed views of philosophers on CLE, based on the article “Issues in the 
Ethical Debate on Considerable Life Extension” (Rantanen 2013). 
 
The table is a tool suitable for mapping out different ethical views related to considerable 
life extension. However, the table does not present a right way of thinking or a simple 
solution to ethical questions related to considerable life extension. It simply provides a tool 
to support understanding and critical evaluation of the ethical discussion.  
 
There exists no single, objective way to place views in the table: the ethical views are often 
very complex and could possibly be situated in multiple different ways. Despite some 
limitations the table can be a useful tool for analyzing ethical discussions. It is useful for 
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decision-makers specifically since it does not provide an opinion on the matter but rather 
an overview based on which to work with.    
 
Below you can find the table with empty sectors (Table 3), which can be used for mapping 
out one’s own ethical view about considerable life extension and philosophical views about 
it. 
  
Individual point of view 
 
Social point of view  
 
Ethical obligation to 
promote CLE 
 
 
 
 
 
Ethical desirability of 
CLE 
 
 
 
 
Ethical acceptability of 
CLE 
  
 
 
Ethical undesirability of 
CLE 
 
 
 
 
 
Ethical obligation to 
prohibit CLE 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: The CLE Table. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
There are arguments that prove that we should carefully consider the development and 
use of technological and medical means that might extend human life considerably. It does 
not seem to me that these arguments are powerful enough to prove that considerable life 
extension is a bad thing in general. People who want to extend their life might not be 
morally praiseworthy but, at least in a liberal society, a person’s will to continue living 
seems to be a right that others are to respect. Denying someone this right would mean 
asking a person to give up something fundamental: a possibility to be alive.45 Furthermore, 
in the future a long life might not be a result of an active choice but rather a consequence 
of medical care. To conclude, considerable life extension might not be morally desirable 
but it is morally acceptable.  
 
I do not see myself as a proponent or opponent of life extension per se. It is somewhat 
unclear in what sense the terms proponent and opponent can be used, since considerable 
life extension can mean various things. It is not evident that there exists a unified 
discussion on the ethics of life extension.  
 
The bioethical discussion related to life extension, independent of its unity, is currently 
dominated by Western (male) philosophers. It is safe to assume that their ideas of good 
life, meaning of death and purpose of life extension leave out a wide variety of 
approaches. This does not undermine the value of the discussion but it is relevant to keep 
in mind, especially when discussing moral values that are inseparable of people’s 
everyday experience, beliefs and fears.   
 
Most people at most times prefer a meaningful, good life over death. Yet we constantly run 
into a paradox that people do not want to live forever, either. However, living for 150, or 
even for a 1000 years is far from living eternally. There are numerous ways to define what 
good life is but it does not seem reasonable to say that only people who are living a good 
life would be entitled to longevity. What seems to be of importance is that life is meaningful 
to the individual whose life is extended.  
 
45 In here I’m assuming that we are talking about a healthy and meaningful way of being alive. 
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I believe that meaning can be experienced in a shorter life, as well, and that the quality of 
life is obviously more important than the quantity. A good and short life is better than a 
long and miserable one. However, it is unclear why a good and long life would not be 
better than a short and good one. There are reasons to be cautious about increasing 
human lifespan but they are contrasted with the very fundamental right of people to stay 
alive (to not die) if they so wish. It seems likely that if human lifespan will be increased, it 
will happen by manipulating the biological aging process. It can happen as a side product 
of aiming to cure aging-related diseases, in which case the increase in lifespan is not 
motivated by longevity itself. In this case, it is harder to find ethical arguments against life 
extension than in the case where human longevity or ‘immortality’ is the single goal.   
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PART TWO: THE ORIGINAL ARTICLES 
Summaries of the Articles 
 
In this part, I will briefly present the main arguments of each original article. In order to 
avoid repetition, I have left out certain statements and statistical facts that have been 
already pointed out in the introduction. However, all the relevant facts and references can 
be found in the original articles. All of the articles can be found in the list of references.  
I Considerable Life Extension versus Immortality  
 
The paper titled ‘Considerable Life Extension versus Immortality’ (2012) discusses the 
difference between the concepts of considerable life extension and immortality. Since 
immortality can be understood as a maximum of life extension, many authors use it for 
referring to a lifespan that is considerably longer than our current one. Although 
rhetorically interesting and powerful, using the term immortality can create unnecessary 
misunderstandings in the ethical debate related to considerable life extension. 
Metaphysical questions about immortality should be separated from arguments in practical 
bioethical discussion in a clearer manner that many authors have done. As the paper 
states, what is true of immortality is not necessarily true of a considerably extended human 
life.  
 
Due to rapid medical and technological development, human life expectancy has been, 
and will be, increasing in a notably. It is tempting to start talking about immortality, 
although being able to extend the lives of lab animals or humans moderately does not 
equal immortality or the possibility of it.  
 
There is an important distinction to be made between immortality and eternal life. 
Immortality refers to something abstract and almost certainly impossible if understood in 
biological terms. Immortality is often mentioned in a religious context or understood 
metaphorically. One can be immortal, say, through art or through their genes. But this is 
not what we are talking about when we are talking about the possibility of a single human 
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individual being immortal. Technically, a person could have the potential to live forever but 
this is not equal to being immune to death; it is still possible for that individual to get into an 
accident, suffer from an unexpected illness or an epidemic, commit suicide and so on. The 
aim of the paper is not to exclude the concept of immortality from the vocabulary from the 
ethical discussion on considerable life extension. Instead, the aim is to point out that 
‘literal’ immortality as a concept should be distinguished from considerable life extension 
via means of medical technology. 
 
In the article, I refer to texts from Leon Kass, John Harris and Larry Temkin as examples of 
using the world immortality. I do not claim that these authors would not understand the 
difference between immortality and life extension but simply that it is desirable to be more 
careful with the terminology. The reason for this is that unclear terminology can easily lead 
to misconceptions that affect the power of argumentation in specific cases. Consider an 
example. Leon Kass states that if we were immortal, we would not be able to enjoy the 
beauty and love in the way that we do now. Even though this may be a valid argument if 
we think about actually being immortal, it barely applies when talking about extended life. If 
we could live hundreds (or even thousands) of years, beauty or love would be unlikely to 
lose their meaning. Also, technologies that might enable considerable human life 
extension are not targeting mortality as such. Medical and technological solutions are 
mostly developed for alleviating age-related illnesses and ailments or to increase the 
lifespan of humans.  
 
Some arguments about the ethical desirability of immortality also hold true of considerable 
life extension. Philosophical questions such as ‘what happens if we live for centuries?’ or 
‘could my personal identity remain the same over centuries?’ are valuable for both thinking 
about immortality and thinking about extended life. This does not mean that there is 
necessarily a connection between the two (it also does not mean there could not be a 
connection).  
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II Considerable Life Extension and the Deprivation View 
 
The paper ‘Considerable Life Extension and the Deprivation View’ (2012) is an 
examination of Thomas Nagel’s so called deprivation view in the context of the ethical 
debate about considerable life extension. The deprivation view states that death deprives 
us of good things in life. The view, supported by Nagel and many others, is often seen as a 
counterargument to the so called Epicurean view that says that death is not bad. 
According to the Epicurean view, death is not to be feared since once we die, there will be 
no one to experience any pain or pleasure - including the ‘nothingness’ or ‘being dead’. 
The main argument of the paper is that although Nagel’s view is compatible with 
supporting life extension, it is not a normative claim that we should support considerable 
life extension, as for example Christine Overall (2003) has suggested. 
 
It is intuitive for people to think that life is good. We tend to think that, in most 
circumstances, being alive is better than being dead and that dying in old age is better 
than dying young. Since life is good, more life is better. The deprivation view states that 
death deprives us of something good. Hence it is a bad thing to die and a good thing to 
stay alive. Nagel states that death is bad because it deprives us of life itself, not just of 
other good things that we might enjoy in our life currently or in the future. In fact, death 
deprives us of any future prospects.    
 
Christine Overall (2003), for one, suggests that Nagel is a supporter of prolongetivism46, 
the view that supports the extension of healthy and productive life. I argue that Nagel does 
not commit to supporting prolongetivism despite stating that life has intrinsic value. Nagel’s 
view is compatible with prolongetivism but this does not mean that it is a normative claim. 
In other words, Nagel’s view does not suggest that we should aim to extend human life as 
much as possible. Instead, he believes that death deprives us of life itself and thus death 
can be considered as a misfortune. As he puts it, death is the permanent end of our 
existence and experience as subjects. All the claims that Nagel is making are from a first 
person perspective and regarding an individual’s incompetence to understand and accept 
 
46 Christine Overall (2003) uses the term prolongetivism to refer to views that support life extension. I use the 
term in my article in relation to Overall’s view but I have excluded it elsewhere in the thesis simply to avoid 
operating with too many ‘-isms’ that are not generally known and might confuse the reader.  
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the permanent end of ourselves. That’s why the argument should not be directly applied to 
societal discussion on the ethics of life extension.  
 
Nagel approaches death as a personal, subjective experience. It is intertwined with an 
individual’s fear of death and ceasing to exist (he states that most of us would probably not 
distinguish between death and a permanent coma as an experience). Thus, like Nagel, 
many of us are likely to want to stay alive at any given moment instead of dying when 
given the choice. However, we do not make decisions purely based on metaphysical 
assumptions or an existential fear. I might be terrified of the idea of death and think that it 
is a bad thing and yet be willing to die, given that death seems to be unavoidable, that my 
death gives space for the next generation and that death is - logically speaking - nothing to 
be afraid of. 
 
For these reasons, Nagel’s view is compatible with prolongetivism but it is also compatible 
with opposite views. Because Nagel’s view on death is influential in modern philosophy, it 
should be carefully examined before making more general claims on it in the wider 
philosophical or public discussion about considerable life extension. My paper aims to 
point out the importance of scrutinizing philosophical claims, including Nagel’s view, about 
fundamental issues related to considerable life extension before accepting arguments 
based on certain interpretation of them.  
III Issues in the Ethical Debate on Considerable Life Extension 
“Issues in the Ethical Debate on Considerable Life Extension” (2013) is an overview on 
some of the ethical questions related to considerable life extension in bioethical discussion 
in the 1990’s and early 2000’s. More than aiming to make a specific claim, the paper is 
meant to clarify what are some of the main issues by influential ethicists such as Peter 
Singer, John Harris, Daniel Callahan and Walter Glannon. I present eight ethical issues. In 
conclusion, I argue that it is unclear whether there exists a unified ethical discussion on 
considerable life extension.  
 
A simple reason for writing this article is similar to the reason behind the whole approach 
of this thesis work: there does not exist many overviews on the ethical debate in the form 
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of articles or books. It is important for anyone interested in the topic to gain a general idea 
of the relevant questions. To summarize, I will introduce a short description of each issue. 
The eight issues examined in the article are listed below.  
 
(1) Is it morally desirable for an individual to live very long?  
 
This issue (re)presents Nagel’s well’know view on death. He says that dying is bad since it 
deprives of good things, namely life itself. Because of this, Nalgel’s view has been seen as 
supporting considerable life extension (although he does not write in the context of life 
extension) by e.g. Christine Overall. However, just because Nage’s view is compatible with 
supporting life extension, it is not a normative claim about it.  
 
(2) Whose interests should guide research into aging?  
 
Singer (1991) has written about who’s interested should guide the research and 
development of possibly life extending solutions. He separates between three options: 
present individuals, future individuals and the human species as a whole. Singer clearly 
accepts the idea of pursuing a longer from an individual’s perspective but concludes that, 
all things considered, it is better to prioritize the interests of future individuals and thus not 
proceed with fast development of technologies that would extend life considerably.   
 
(3) Which policy is more benevolent regarding life extension technologies?  
 
Russell Blackford has argued against Singer’s position by saying that developing life 
extending solutions would be the most benevolent thing to do. Blackford states that 
Singer’s utilitarian view is too strict and that is is not our moral responsibility to prioritize 
the future individuals’ interest over time. 
 
(4) Should we try to defeat the biological process of aging?  
 
Aubrey de Grey has stated that aging kills a lot of people and we should fight it as we fight 
other life threatening diseases. Many people do die of diseases caused by aging but it is 
not clear whether we should treat this as an anomaly or simply as part of life and the 
biology of our species. Somewhat unrelated to de Grey (he does not claim to be a 
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philosopher or talk in terms of human enhancement), if we accept that aging is a disease, 
it seems to be requiring treatment. This would place anti-aging solutions in the realm of 
treatments as opposed to human enhancements, in which they are often discussed.   
 
(5) How should we regulate the scientific research on technologies that might lead to 
considerable life extension?  
 
Some philosophers support a cautious approach on developing considerable life extension 
technologies despite not condemning life extension as morally undesirable. Walter 
Glannon, for one, raises the concern of what might be the social and environmental costs 
of developing the technologies: he calls for a careful risk assessment, especially in the 
field of gene manipulation. Harris and Holm have called Glannon’s approach ‘the 
precautionary view’. It seems that Glannon’s requirement is not extreme and seems 
reasonable assuming he is just calling for a careful and responsible consideration of risks 
and benefits before developing new technologies.  
 
(6) Should we reject life extending technologies because of the overpopulation problem? 
 
John Davis (2005) has tackled what he calls the Malthusian objection, namely the view 
that developing considerable life extension technologies would lead to an unbearable 
overpopulation issue. Davis acknowledged this view as an important worry but states that 
it is not a sufficient reason to restrict the development and use of life extending solutions.  
 
(7) Should we uphold the “natural human life cycle” instead of pursuing extreme longevity? 
 
Leon Kass (2003) rejects both the desirability of an extremely long life for an individual as 
well as the societal consequences of considerable life extension. Kass emphasizes the 
importance of maintaining the ‘natural human life cycle’ and the possibility of continuity by 
having children. He also states that death brings meaning to life and the absence of death 
would take that meaning away.  
(8) Is it morally acceptable to use technologies that extend life radically?   
 
Daniel Callahan (2005) has a skeptical approach toward life extending technologies. He 
wishes that people would not accept the goal of extending human life considerably. 
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Simultaneously, he seems to accept research and development of life extending 
technologies, as he wishes to ‘stigmatize’ those technologies on a legal level. He 
expresses a moral judgement toward an individual aiming for considerable life extension 
and a society that aims to develop means for that but seems to appreciate individual 
freedom of choice above this ethical judgement.  
 
At first sight, there exists a general theme of ethical acceptability of considerable life 
extension in philosophical discussion. However, the issues are diverse and multifaceted, 
varying from metaphysical questions (such as the meaning of life and death) to practical 
ones (such as fair distribution within a certain state’s healthcare system). The ideas of 
what is meant by considerable or what is meant by life extending technologies, and in 
which level of realism these are understood, vary. Because of this, it is relevant to ask 
whether there actually exists a unified discussion on the ethics of considerable life 
extension. It is crucial to be careful and observant while analyzing discussion around the 
issue, since some arguments are not necessarily discussing with each other, even though 
it may seem like that at first. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
64 
 
IV Is Considerable Life Extension an Enhancement?  
 
In the paper ‘Is Considerable Life Extension an Enhancement?’ (2014), I examine the role 
of the human enhancement discussion in relation to ethical debate about considerable life 
extension. Many authors, including Savulescu, Kahane, Sandberg, Bostrom, Harris and 
Holtug, have placed the discussion about life extension in the realm of human 
enhancement. My general claim in the article is that there is no necessity to discuss 
considerable life extension in primarily in this realm. It can be seen as a wider 
phenomenon that could also be classified as a preventive measure. It is widely accepted 
that resources in medicine and healthcare should mainly be targeted to treatment and 
prevention, whereas enhancements are considered something ‘extra’. Whether future life 
extending measures are defined as enhancement or treatment can have a significant role 
in defining whether they should receive public funding and be a part of the basic health 
care system.  
 
Typically, bioethicists separate between treatment and enhancement, Norman Daniels 
being one of the pioneers of this debate. Enhancement is something that increases human 
capacities above average level. Treatment aims to maintain our health on a level that is 
considered normal. The definitions are rough and have been discussed widely in bioethics. 
Concepts such as health, sick and normal are complicated and escape a simple definition. 
Despite some general agreements, there is no clear cut distinction between treatment and 
enhancement. Nor is it clear whether they should be considered as part of health care. In 
my view, it is possible - and in fact likely - that considerable life extension measures will be 
a combination of things, including different treatments and preventive measures.  
 
Our current life expectancy is a result of rapid increase due to both social and political 
factors (gender equality and basic education, nutrition, sanitation) as well as basic 
healthcare and preventive measures. One example of an effective preventive measure are 
vaccinations that have been a major factor in decreasing child mortality and increasing the 
global life expectancy.  
 
I do not claim that considerable life extension solutions could not be enhancements in 
some hypothetical cases. They could be enhancements, treatment and prevention all at 
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once. It is likely that human life expectancy continues to increase as a result of multiple 
political, social, medical and technological factors, just as it has done so far. In my view, 
even if we would see life extension as enhancement, it is different from other forms of 
enhancements, such as improving strength, speed or morality. Even though life can be 
extended, it cannot be multiplied as other enhancements: at any given moment, one either 
is alive or is not. This is a further reason to reconsider the use of the word enhancement.  
 
Because of the fundamental nature of the question of considerable life extension, it should 
be carefully examined morally before moving on to discussions about distributing 
resources, and other more practical questions. We should search to answer questions 
such as is it intrinsically a good thing to live long, what is a good life and how should we 
define life extension. However, the question about enhancement is also of extreme 
importance, since scientific development happen rapidly and how we define potential 
considerable life extension measure may affect their social acceptability, the resources 
that are allocated for them and regulations been made by decision-makers. 
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V Book review: James Stacey Taylor (Ed.): The Metaphysics and 
Ethics of Death, with Juha Räikkä 
 
This review of James Stacey Taylor’s (ed.) book ‘The Metaphysics and Ethics of Death’ is 
written together with Professor Juha Räikkä (2014). The book is an overview of 
metaphysical and ethical discussion on issues related to philosophy of death. 
 
Death has always been a natural part of philosophical discussion and Western 
Philosopher’s arguments about death have been documented since Antiquity. During the 
past few decades, there seems to have been a kind of a renaissance of philosophy of 
death, as Taylor himself notes (Taylor 2014, 2). There has been a growing number of 
encyclopedias and other literature on death. The collection edited by Taylor brings 
together a bunch of well-established authors to reflect on issues around death focusing on 
both more traditional metaphysical questions as well as more contemporary bioethical 
issues.  
 
 While perhaps not groundbreaking, the book is a relevant overview to philosophical 
thanatology and definitely useful for studying the topic. The issue of euthanasia was left 
out because of the regrettable passing away of the intended author during the writing 
process. The theme of immortality does not have a notable part in the book. These facts 
result in a big part of traditional and contemporary philosophical views related to death 
being left out of the book.   
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